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The United States has more than 2.6 million miles of paved roads and highways 
(FHWA 2013), and 93% of this infrastructure is surfaced with asphalt. Maintenance of 
paved roads and highways, in addition to new projects, requires a significant amount of 
asphalt. Each year, more than 500 million tons of asphalt mixture are produced in the 
United States (NAPA 2015), and the demand is forecasted to increase 3.3% annually 
(Freedonia 2015). However, significant volatility and unprecedented uncertainty in the 
price of asphalt cement is a serious challenge for both contractors and state departments of 
transportation (DOTs) with regard to proper cost estimation and budgeting of 
transportation projects (Damnjanovic et al. 2009). Previous studies indicate that owner 
organizations often overpay for projects under fixed-price contracts that transfer the 
material price risk to contractors due to increased risk premiums and hidden contingencies 
in contractors’ submitted bid prices. A common method widely used by state DOTs to 
handle the issue of extra risk premiums in submitted bid prices and to avoid overpayment 
to contractors is to offer price adjustment clauses (PACs) in contracts. A PAC is a risk-
sharing contractual mechanism that guarantees an adjustment in payment to contractors 
based on the size and direction of the material price change. 
Although volatility and uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement is a serious 
challenge for both contractors and state DOTs, there is little knowledge about how asphalt 
cement prices fluctuate over time. The ability to forecast asphalt cement price can result in 
more accurate cost estimations and budgeting. The first research objective of this thesis is 
to develop appropriate univariate time series models to forecast the price of asphalt cement. 
xxi 
 
In chapter 3, after identifying the characteristics of historical records of asphalt cement 
price index, four univariate time series forecasting models, Holt Exponential Smoothing, 
Holt-Winters Exponential Smoothing, Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMA), and seasonal ARIMA, are created to forecast future values of asphalt cement 
price. The results indicate the future price of asphalt cement can be predicted with less than 
2% error. 
Second, there is little knowledge about measuring, analyzing, and forecasting 
asphalt cement price volatility. This gap in knowledge makes it difficult to develop material 
price risk management strategies properly. The second research objective of this thesis 
therefore is to measure, model, and forecast asphalt cement price volatility. In chapter 4, 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) time series models are created to model the 
conditional volatility of asphalt cement price over time. The results indicate that 
uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement can be modeled and forecasted with less than 3% 
error. 
Although PAC is a very common risk management strategy to address the 
consequences of material price uncertainty, it is not clear how offering PACs in 
transportation contracts affects the submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items. The 
third research objective of this thesis is to examine the effect that offering of PACs has on 
variation in contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in transportation 
projects via multivariate regression models. In chapter 5, multivariate regression models 
that have the power to explain variations in the submitted bid prices for major asphalt line 
items are used to empirically assess the impact of PACs on bid prices. No evidence was 
xxii 
 
found to support the hypothesis that offering PACs would reduce submitted bid prices for 
major asphalt line items. 
Finally, there is little knowledge about the effects of PACs on the level of 
competition among bidders. The fourth research objective of this dissertation is to 
empirically analyze the effects that offering PACs has on the competition among bidders 
for transportation projects. The level of competition is quantified based on the number of 
bidders and the dispersion of the submitted bid prices. In chapter 6, a system monitoring 
process is conducted to empirically examine the impact of the offering of PACs on number 
of bidders and the dispersion of submitted bid prices. The results show that there is no 
empirical evidence to indicate that offering PACs would increase the number of bidders or 
decrease the dispersion of the submitted bid prices for asphalt line items. 
The primary contributions of this study to the existing body of knowledge are as 
follows: (1) creation of univariate time series forecasting models for asphalt cement price 
indexes, (2) creation of ARCH/GARCH models to measure and forecast the volatility of 
asphalt cement price index, (3) creation of multivariate regression models to explain 
variation in highway contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items, (4) 
empirical assessment of whether offering PACs contributes to variation in contractors’ 
submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in highway projects, and (5) empirical 
assessment of whether offering PACs affects the number of bidders and the dispersion of 
bid prices. 
The primary contributions of this study to the state of practice are as follows: (1) 
helping contractors and state DOTs prepare more accurate cost estimates, bids, and budgets 
for highway construction projects; (2) helping contractors and state DOTs to analyze the 
xxiii 
 
uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement and to develop proper risk management 
strategies; (3) enhancing the understanding that capital planners of transportation agencies 
have of important variables affecting submitted bid prices in transportation projects and 
the effects that offering PACs has on bid prices; (4) helping contractors price PACs, 
develop their risk profiles, and determine their bid price; and (5) helping state DOTs assess 
the received bids more accurately. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The United States has more than 2.6 million miles of paved roads and highways 
(FHWA 2013), and 93% of this infrastructure is surfaced with asphalt. Maintenance of 
paved roads and highways, in addition to new projects, requires a significant amount of 
asphalt. Each year, more than 500 million tons of asphalt mixture is produced in the United 
States (NAPA 2015), and the demand is forecasted to increase 3.3% annually (Freedonia 
2015). 
1.1. Uncertainty in Price of Asphalt Cement 
Significant volatility and unprecedented uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement 
is a serious challenge for both contractors and state departments of transportation (DOTs) 
with regard to proper cost estimation and budgeting of transportation projects 
(Damnjanovic et al. 2009). The volatility in the price of asphalt cement may lead to 
uncertainty about project cost. Cost uncertainty in turn may increase risk for contractors in 
fixed-price contracts and, consequently, may lead to price speculation and inflated bid 
prices being submitted by contractors to secure their profits against possible price increases 
(Damnjanovic et al. 2009). Therefore, owner organizations may face price speculation, 
inflated bids, very short-term price guarantees, and too few bidders for a project. 
Contractors may lose bids due to cost overestimation or lose profits due to cost 
underestimation (Ashuri and Lu 2010). 
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The price of crude oil and its byproducts, such as asphalt cement, have been more 
volatile than the price of many other commodities since the 1973 oil crisis (Fleming and 
Ostdiek 1999; Verleger 1994). This problem has worsened in the last decade. From 2003 
through 2005, asphalt cement prices increased roughly 4% per year, but between August 
2005 and August 2006, asphalt cement prices spiked by 38% (Gallagher and Riggs 2006). 
Figure 1-1 shows the considerable fluctuations in the average price of asphalt cement in 
the state of Georgia from September 1995 to July 2015. 
 
 































































































1.2. Price Adjustment Clauses 
Several DOTs share the concern that they often overpay for projects under fixed-
price contracts, which transfer the material price risk to contractors due to increased risk 
premiums and hidden contingencies in contractors’ submitted bid prices (Eckert and Eger 
2005). For example, transportation officials in Kentucky, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, 
and Washington state DOTs believed that they may have paid more money to contractors 
than actual added costs, due to increased material prices (Holmgren et al. 2010).  
A common method that state DOTs widely use to handle the issue of extra risk 
premiums in submitted bid prices and to avoid overpaying contractors is to offer price 
adjustment clauses (PACs) in contracts. PACs are risk-sharing strategies to divide the risk 
of upward and downward movements of material prices between owners and contractors. 
In other words, a PAC is a risk-sharing contractual mechanism that guarantees an 
adjustment in payment to contractors based on the size and direction of the material price 
change. In a contract with a PAC, a state DOT accepts at least part of the risk of price 
escalation and pays the contractor for any increases above an agreed-upon threshold. 
Furthermore, if the price decreases below the threshold, the state DOT benefits from the 
savings. This risk-sharing strategy protects contractors against future material price 
escalation and encourages them to exclude extra risk premiums from their submitted bid 
prices. State DOTs may benefit from this shift in risk allocation through contractors’ 
willingness to submit lower bids (Skolnik 2011). Currently, offering PACs is the most 
common risk-management strategy for handling the consequences of material price 
uncertainty. Results from a Delphi survey of transportation experts show that PACs are 
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among the top ten programs widely used as cost reduction methods (Damnjanovic et al. 
2009). 
1.3. History of Price Adjustment Clauses 
PACs were used for the first time in the United States during World War I to 
manage the rapidly increasing price of coal (Baron and De Bondt 1979). In the 1970s, 
electric utilities faced significant increases in the price of fuel inputs, which resulted in 
many utility investors having to absorb unexpected increases in fuel costs. Motivated by 
the concern that these costs ultimately would be borne by consumers, 43 out of 50 states 
either adopted or expanded existing fuel adjustment clauses (FACs) by 1974 (Golec 1990). 
PACs can be divided into two categories:  redetermination processes, which adjust prices 
by a predetermined formula, and renegotiation processes, which establish prices through 
agreement by both parties. Redetermination processes are more frequently used compared 
to renegotiation process (Crocker and Masten 1991). The literature indicates that 
redetermination processes are more efficient and more frequently used due to the higher 
cost of implementing negotiated price changes (Carrol et al. 2006). 
Contrary to the widespread application of adjustment clauses in the electric utility 
industry, the impact of this clause was controversial, and in the late 1970s and during the 
1980s, poor efficiency resulting from the PAC program was a hot topic. Baron and De 
Bondt (1979) observed that FACs can lead to inefficiency problems related to the choice 
of technology and the selection of fuel supply sources because if utilities can shift all fuel 
cost increases to consumers, then there is no incentive to select the lowest-cost fuel supply.  
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Kaserman and Tepel (1982) found that FACs can lead to unnecessarily high utility 
company costs because of an adverse aggregate input price effect. They examined the 
influence of automatic FACs on the prices paid by electric utilities for aggregate fuel input. 
They asserted that the direct correlation between output price and aggregate fuel cost might 
lead to prices that are higher for aggregate fuel inputs than they would be in the absence of 
adjustment clauses.  
Gollop and Karlson (1978) empirically analyzed the effects of the electric utility’s 
ability to recover costs through an automatic fuel adjustment mechanism on the average 
cost. The authors found that the adjustment clause might lead to higher fuel costs because 
of inefficiency. They suggested that frequent monitoring of FAC provisions can prevent 
inefficient behavior while allowing utilities to recover quickly increasing input costs during 
times of high inflation. Later, in 1982, Isaac examined the effects of the FAC on the input 
choice of electric utilities and confirmed that adjustment mechanisms can lead to 
inefficiencies in input choices. However, these mechanisms also can help to preserve the 
financial integrity of electric utilities. Kendrick (1975) examined the impact of adjustments 
clauses on the telecommunications industry and concluded that the mechanism should 
consist of efficiency incentives to ensure good productivity. 
Since 1974, other industries, such as building and highway construction, have 
gradually begun offering PAC for selected commodities to handle the problem of inflated 
bids (Holmgren et al 2010). In 1974, the American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) suggested implementing PACs in transportation 
projects (AASHTO 1974). In 2009, a survey by the AASHTO Subcommittee on 
Construction, Contract Administration Section showed that only 3 agencies—Arkansas, 
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Michigan, and Texas DOTs—do not employ PACs in their contracts. Furthermore, 40 state 
DOTs offer the PAC for asphalt cement, and 42 state DOTs offer the PAC for fuel 
(AASHTO 2009).  
1.4. Design of Price Adjustment Clauses 
Although the primary purpose of all PAC programs across the United States is to 
shift the risk of material price fluctuations from contractor to state DOTs and, 
consequently, eliminate the possibility of risk premiums in contractors’ submitted bids, 
different transportation agencies use various design elements in their PAC programs. The 
most important design elements are the type of eligible materials, calculation of the index, 
trigger points, the presence of opt-in or opt-out, and formulas to calculate the price 






























Trigger points refer to the percent changes in material prices that initiate the 
application of relevant adjustment clauses. The distribution of the trigger point is broad. A 
large group of state DOTs uses 5-7.5% as the trigger value. Skolnik (2011) surveyed the 
AASHTO members to develop Figure 1-3, which depicts the distribution of the trigger 
point for various eligible line items.  
 
 
Figure 1-3: Trigger points for price adjustment (Source: Skolnik 2011) 
 
Opt-in or opt-out indicates whether the contractor has the right to accept or decline 
the PAC after the contract is awarded. The results of the AASHTO members survey (2009) 
indicate that only a small percentage of states with PACs also have opt-in clauses, which 
give contractors the right to decide whether to accept the PAC. Figure 1-4 shows the 
number of state DOTs that has an opt-in policy. 
Furthermore, some state DOTs, such as New York State, Iowa, and Montana, apply 
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DOT applies adjustment for fuel when the fuel price changes by at least 10 cents (Holmgren 
et al. 2010).   
 
 
Figure 1-4: Number of states that has an opt-in policy for various line items (Source: Skolnik 2011) 
 
Some state DOTs always offer PACs for all projects, whereas some state DOTs 
offer PACs under specific conditions for some projects. Figure 1-5 shows the percentages 
of different contract conditions for PAC exclusion in the state DOTs that offer PACs. It 
can be seen that just over half of state DOTs exclude projects from these clauses for specific 
pay items, 38% of state DOTs exclude projects based on minimum pay item quantities, 
23% of state DOTs exclude projects by dollar amount, 17% of state DOTs exclude projects 
by project duration, and 17% of state DOTs exclude only designated projects. No state 
DOT was reported to exclude projects because they are funded solely at the state level. It 
can be concluded that projects are generally excluded from the PAC due to the type of 





























Specific pay items are most likely not included due to small amounts of fuel or construction 
inputs consumed or a lack of reliable data at the level of usage for those pay items. 
Moreover, based on the contract conditions for PAC exclusion, around 25% of projects in 
the states with the PAC are not eligible for this clause (Skolnik 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1-5: Distribution of contract conditions among state DOTs for PAC exclusion (Source: 
Skolnik 2011) 
 
1.5. Price Adjustment Clause in Georgia 
The Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) has offered PAC for asphalt 
cement in transportation projects since September 2005. GDOT changed the provision of 
PAC for asphalt cement two times, in 2009 and 2011. The main objectives of all three 
provisions of PAC for asphalt cement are the same; however, they are different in design 















































1.5.1. PAC Provision of 2005 
GDOT first developed the PAC provision for asphalt cement on September 15, 
2005. Based on this provision, if the asphalt cement price for the current month is greater 
than the asphalt cement price for the month in which the project was let to contract, the 







PA = price adjustment; 
APM = the monthly asphalt cement price (Georgia base asphalt price [GBAP]) for the 
month the hot mix asphalt/bituminous tack/bituminous surface treatment is placed; 
APL = the monthly asphalt cement price (GBAP)” for the month that the project was let; 
TMT = total monthly tonnage of asphalt cement computed by the engineer based on the hot 
mix asphaltic concrete of the various types per ton. 
On the other hand, if the asphalt cement price for the current month is less than the 
asphalt cement price for the month in which the project was let to contract, GDOT will 







According to the above formulas, no price adjustment shall be made until the APM 
is greater than 5% above or below the APL. This 5% trigger point is one of the most 
important design elements of the PAC program.  
Based on this provision of the PAC, the monthly asphalt cement price index is 
determined based on both national base asphalt price (NBAP) and local base asphalt price 
(LBAP). NBAP is calculated based on the arithmetic average of the previous four weeks’ 
Posted Price Asphalt Cement for the East Coast market-GA/FL as listed in the Asphalt 
Weekly Monitor, published by Poten and Partners. However, LBAP is calculated based on 
the arithmetic average posted price of PG asphalt cement from GDOT’s monthly survey, 
obtained from approved asphalt cement suppliers of bituminous materials to GDOT 
projects and the suppliers terminal after removing the highest and the lowest price. 
The other important characteristics of the PAC are the eligibility criteria and 
restrictions. The restrictions of this provision are as follows: 
• A price adjustment shall not be made on any hot mix asphalt placed between the 
letting date and 180 days after the letting date. 
• Cut-back, tack-coat, and treatment projects are not eligible for price adjustment. 
• There is a cap of 50% above the APL for any price adjustment. 
• After the original contract time has expired, no further asphalt cement price 
adjustment will be made. The asphalt cement price adjustment for any hot mix 
asphalt placed after the original contract time expires will be computed based on 
the monthly asphalt cement price at the time of contract expiration or the monthly 
asphalt cement price at the time the contract was let, whichever is less. 
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1.5.2. PAC Provision of 2009 
GDOT established a new provision for price adjustment on August 21, 2009. The 
most important differences between the second version and the first are the cap on the price 
adjustment and the eligibility criteria for the projects. In the second version, GDOT 
increased the cap from 50% to 125%. Thus, after August 21, 2009, any volatility of the 
asphalt cement price index, from 5% to 125%, is covered by the PAC program. 
Furthermore, according to the second version, no price adjustment will be made on any 
project with fewer than 366 calendar days between the contract letting date and the 
specified completion date. The duration between the original completion date and the 
letting date was not a criterion for eligibility under the 2005 version of the PAC program. 
However, for all eligible projects based on the provision of 2005, a price adjustment was 
not made between the letting date and 180 days after the letting date. 
1.5.3. PAC Provision of 2011 
Two years after the 2009 provision, on August 19, 2011, GDOT revised the PAC 
program and established the third provision. The 5% trigger point was canceled in the third 





Another change in the third version compared to the second is the reduction of the 
cap from 125% to 60%. Furthermore, the calculation of the asphalt cement price index is 
only based on the GBAP, which is determined based on the arithmetic average of posted 
prices of PG asphalt cement from GDOT’s monthly survey, obtained from approved 
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asphalt cement suppliers of bituminous materials to GDOT projects and the suppliers 
terminal. 
1.6. Potential Benefits of Price Adjustment Clauses 
Owner organizations may benefit from a PAC in two main ways. First, offering 
PACs encourages contractors to exclude extra risk premiums from their bid prices and 
consequently submit lower bid prices. Second, offering PACs can potentially boost 
competition among bidders and result in a higher number of bidders and less dispersion in 
the bid prices received for a project. Skolnik (2011) conducted a survey of 50 state DOTs 
and 400 highway construction contractors to identify the possible benefits and beneficiaries 
of and barriers to the successful implementation of the PAC. The results indicate that the 
most important benefits of the PAC from the viewpoint of state DOTs are: 
- Better bid prices (78% of respondents noted this benefit) 
- Contractor stability (56% of respondents noted this benefit) 
- Increased number of bidders (24% of respondents noted this benefit) 
- Fewer bid retractions (2% of respondents noted this benefit) 
In addition, a percentage of state DOT respondents reported perceived benefits of offering 
the PAC for various commodities: 
- Fuel (60%) 
- Liquid asphalt (63%) 
- Cement (most state DOTs do not offer the PAC for cement; of the 10% that do, half 
perceived significant benefits) 
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- Steel (a large number of state DOTs do not offer the PAC for steel; of the 39% that 
do, 13% perceived significant benefits) 
Moreover, a percentage of state DOT respondents reported perceived benefits of offering 
the PAC for various industry stakeholders: 
- Prime contractors (81%)  
- Subcontractors (70%) 
- State DOTs (61%)  
- Suppliers (60%) 
- Others (2% of the respondents perceived a significant benefit for taxpayers) 
On the other hand, a percentage of contractor respondents reported perceived benefits of 
offering the PAC for various commodities:  
- Liquid asphalt (91%) 
- Fuel (72%) 
- Steel (72%) 
- Cement (58%) 
Furthermore, a percentage of contractor respondents reported perceived benefits of offering 
the PAC for various industry stakeholders:  
- State DOTs (82%) 
- Prime contractors (83%) 
- Subcontractors (84%) 
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- Suppliers (78%)  
Identification of the most important barriers to successful implementation of the PAC is 
critical. The results of the survey by Skolnik (2011) indicate that the most important 
barriers to successfully implementing the PAC from the viewpoint of state DOTs are 
- Administrative cost  
- Contractor resistance 
- Process of creating the policy 
- Updated fuel usage factors 
- Costs of the programs do not justify the benefits 
However, the barriers most cited by contractors are 
- Timing on invoices versus the index payment calculations—this problem involves 
a discrepancy between the date the materials are purchased and the index date used 
by state DOTs 
- A high trigger value for index payments 
- Incorrect index values, either due to outdated indexes or incorrect calculations 
Eckert and Eger (2005) gave a list of possible barriers to successful implementation of the 
PAC: 
- Contracts must have set-aside contingency funding to be able to address indexed 
adjustments. These funds, whether used or not, are tied to a contract (i.e., are not 
available for other work) until the contract is closed. 
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- Risk management is not well understood by most, and therefore the long-run 
benefits may not be understood.  
- Suppliers could be artificially raising prices, which will affect the index without the 
state DOT’s knowledge.  
- It is extremely difficult to track payments under the index process over the years. 
Adjustments increase the complexity of the tracking process.  
- It is difficult to ensure that the prices quoted by suppliers for the index are true 




CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH 
OBJECTIVES 
2.1. Motivation and Gaps in Knowledge 
Although uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement is a serious challenge for both 
contractors and state DOTs and many transportation agencies use PACs to control the 
consequences of material price volatility, there is little knowledge about analyzing 
uncertainties in the price of asphalt cement and the actual performance of PACs. These 
gaps in the current state of knowledge may result in significant financial risks and 
inefficient investments in risk management strategies.  
2.1.1. Gap in Knowledge 1: Modeling and Forecasting Fluctuations in the Price of 
Asphalt Cement 
Although fluctuations in the price of asphalt cement are a critical source of risk in 
highway construction projects with regard to cost estimations and budgeting, there is little 
knowledge about how asphalt cement price fluctuates over time. The ability to forecast 
asphalt cement price could result in more accurate cost estimations and budgeting.     
In the current state of practice, a simple escalation approach is typically used to 
take into account the rise in asphalt cement price. For example, cost estimators inflate the 
estimated cost of materials to the expected midpoint of the construction date to capture 
possible changes in the future prices of materials in their estimates (Anderson et al. 2006). 
Another approach often used by cost estimators is to add a fixed percentage of the total 
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estimated cost as the risk premium to cover possible escalation in material prices, including 
the price of asphalt cement (Laryea and Hughes 2009). These simple methods do not take 
into account the fact that the price of asphalt cement is subject to significant variations, 
even over a short period of time. These approaches are limited in characterizing the 
variations of asphalt cement price over time and, hence, are problematic for distributing 
the project budget over the project duration (Walls and Smith 1998).  
Currently, a more advanced approach to modeling variations in material prices over 
time is the Monte Carlo simulation. Considering the uncertainty about the rate of escalation 
for the price of asphalt cement, a probabilistic approach based on Monte Carlo simulation 
has been used to quantify the range and the likelihood of the project cost (Back et al. 2000). 
Monte Carlo simulation has been used to draw random values for the escalation rate of 
material price in order to characterize uncertainty about total project cost. An approach 
based on Monte Carlo simulation can be used to characterize uncertainty about future 
prices of asphalt cement, but the major limitation of this approach is that Monte Carlo 
simulation does not address the effects of autocorrelation in historical prices of asphalt 
cement (note that autocorrelation represents the relationship between a time series variable 
and itself over various time intervals). At any point in time, a Monte Carlo simulation 
randomly generates an escalation rate independent of the previous rates (Ibbotson 2005)—
for example, the randomly generated escalation rate of asphalt cement price could be –10% 
in one period and +60% in the next. In this study, we show that actual historical records of 
asphalt cement price are autocorrelated time series data. Variations in the escalation rate of 
asphalt cement price are not completely random. Past values of asphalt cement are 
statistically significant in determining its current and future values. Using historical records 
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of asphalt cement prices to develop proper forecasting models is a motivation for the third 
chapter of this dissertation. 
2.1.2. Gap in Knowledge 2: Quantifying and Forecasting Uncertainties in the Price of 
Asphalt Cement 
Transportation agencies apply various risk management strategies, such as offering 
PACs, to control the consequences of material price uncertainty. Before using any risk 
management strategy, it is necessary to measure, analyze, and forecast material price 
uncertainty and ensure that the strategy is employed at the proper time. This issue is more 
critical for asphalt cement because the level of volatility and uncertainty in its price is not 
constant over time and may change significantly even over a short period of time. 
Transportation agencies need to constantly track the level of uncertainty in the price of 
asphalt cement to keep decisions about implementing their risk management strategies 
current. However, there is little knowledge about measuring, analyzing, and forecasting 
uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement. Typically, cost estimators and risk managers 
consider the uncertainty in the price of materials such as asphalt cement solely based on 
their fluctuations (Gallagher and Riggs 2006). However, fluctuations do not necessarily 
indicate uncertainty: A variable might be fluctuating but predictable. Therefore, the 
uncertainty of a variable such as the price of asphalt cement should be defined based on its 
unpredictability, which is a latent variable and is not directly observable (Engle and Patton 
2001). This gap in knowledge makes it difficult for transportation agencies to recognize 
the proper time to implement their risk management strategies and adequately control the 
consequences of volatility in the price of asphalt cement. Quantifying and forecasting 
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uncertainties in the price of asphalt cement is a motivation for the fourth chapter of this 
dissertation. 
2.1.3. Gap in Knowledge 3: Empirically Analyzing Effects of PACs on Submitted Bid 
Prices 
State DOTs may benefit from PACs through contractors’ willingness to submit 
lower bids (Skolnik 2011). Most state DOTs in the United States have employed PACs in 
their transportation contracts. In 2009, a survey done by the AASHTO Subcommittee on 
Construction, Contract Administration Section, indicates that 40 state DOTs offer PACs 
for asphalt cement. The results from a Delphi study of transportation experts show that 
PAC is among the top ten program-wide cost reduction methods (Damnjanovic et al. 2009). 
However, most of the findings of previous studies of PACs derived from surveys of state 
DOT officials and other transportation experts and the actual impacts that offering PACs 
has on bid prices are not clear. For example, a survey of 50 state DOT officials and 400 
highway contractors conducted by Skolnik (2011) revealed that 78% of state DOTs 
perceived reduced bid prices as one of the most important benefits of offering PAC. 
Additionally, nearly all responding contractors mentioned that they would add 
contingencies to their bids in the absence of PACs. In other words, most survey respondents 
perceived reduction in bid prices as one of the most significant benefits of offering PAC in 
transportation contracts. However, none of the respondents to Skolnik’s survey provided 
any empirical evidence to support their perception. 
In another study conducted by Eckert and Eger (2005), several state DOT officials 
were surveyed about the risk of asphalt price volatility and their current price adjustments. 
The authors recognized a concern shared by several state DOT officials that state DOTs 
21 
 
often overpay for projects under fixed-price contracts that transfer the asphalt price risk to 
contractors. Interviewees argued that highway contractors add hidden contingencies to 
their submitted bid prices if the asphalt price risk is transferred to them in highway projects. 
However, no empirical evidence was provided by the interviewees, and no comparison was 
made between contractors’ submitted bid prices in projects with PACs and those without 
PACs.  
In a similar study of fuel PACs, Holmgren et al. (2010) surveyed DOT officials 
from all fifty states. Thirty-eight state DOT officials believed that PACs can share the risks 
of price volatility appropriately and that their fuel price adjustments are fair. However, they 
did not provide any empirical evidence to justify their beliefs. 
A review of the literature revealed a gap in the current state of knowledge in 
empirical assessment of PACs. Furthermore, the considerable financial burden PACs 
impose on state DOTs (e.g., GDOT’s net payment to contractors as a PAC only for asphalt 
cement exceeded 69 million dollars between 2007 and 2012) emphasizes the importance 
of analyzing the actual effects that offering PACs has on submitted bid prices. 
2.1.4. Gap in Knowledge 4: Empirically Analyzing Effects of PACs on Competition 
In addition to excluding extra risk premiums from submitted bid prices, 
transportation agencies may benefit from PACs through increased competition among 
bidders. Offering PACs may boost competition among bidders and result in a greater 
number of bidders and less dispersion in the bid prices received for a project. Lack of 
competition would harm economic efficiency (Cheung and Shen 2016). Theoretically, 
offering PACs in contracts can stabilize the construction market and support all contractors 
regardless of their size and access to sources of critical materials such as asphalt cement. 
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Therefore, offering PACs in construction contracts may encourage greater competition and 
result in more bidders and less dispersion in the bid prices received for a project. Most 
findings from previous studies of PACs, derived from surveys of state DOT officials and 
other transportation experts, are not clear when assessing the actual impact of offering 
PACs. For example, a survey of 50 state DOT officials and 400 highway contractors 
conducted by Skolnik (2011) revealed that 61% of the respondents believed that PACs 
offer significant benefits for DOTs and lead to contractor stability and a greater number of 
bidders. However, none of the respondents to Skolnik’s survey provided any empirical 
evidence to support their perception. In another study conducted by Eckert and Eger 
(2005), several state DOT officials were surveyed about the risk of asphalt price volatility 
and their current price adjustments. Most of the officials believed that offering PACs 
establishes parity between bidders and increases competition. However, no empirical 
evidence was provided by the interviewees. In a similar study of fuel PACs, Holmgren et 
al. (2010) surveyed officials from the DOTs of all fifty states; thirty-eight state DOT 
officials believed that PACs can allocate the risks of price volatility appropriately and that 
their fuel price adjustments are fair. However, they did not provide any empirical evidence 
to justify their beliefs. The actual impact of PACs on competition has not been analyzed, 
and a review of the literature indicates a gap in the current state of knowledge in empirical 
assessment of PACs. 
2.2. Research Objectives 
Due to the aforementioned gaps in the current state of knowledge, this dissertation 
aims to analyze uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement and examine the performance of 
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PACs in highway construction projects. This overall research objective is broken down 
into four sub-objectives. 
2.2.1. Research Objective Ⅰ: Modeling and Forecasting Asphalt Cement Price 
Due to the first gap in knowledge, the first research objective of this study is to 
identify and characterize variations observed in the actual price of asphalt cement over 
time. This knowledge then will be used to create time series forecasting models for asphalt 
cement price and examine whether and how time series forecasting models can predict the 
future price of asphalt cement with greater accuracy than the existing approaches. 
The results of this part of the study help both state DOTs and contractors improve 
their cost estimations, prepare more accurate budgets, and consequently reduce the risk of 
asphalt cement price volatility in highway construction projects. 
2.2.2. Research Objective Ⅱ: Quantifying and Forecasting Uncertainty in Asphalt 
Cement Price 
Due to the second gap in knowledge, the second research objective of this study is 
to measure, model, and forecast asphalt cement price uncertainty. The results of this part 
of the study can help contractors and state DOTs measure and forecast volatility in the 
price of asphalt cement and subsequently develop more proper risk management strategies 
to address the risk of material price uncertainty in highway construction projects. 
2.2.3. Research Objective Ⅲ: Examining Effects of PACs on Bid Prices 
Due to the third identified gap in the current state of knowledge, the third research 
objective of this dissertation is to empirically examine the effect that offering PACs has on 
variation in submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in transportation projects and 
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to check whether PACs successfully exclude extra risk premiums. The outcomes of this 
objective enhance transport agencies’ understanding of the actual effects of offering PACs 
in reducing bid prices. 
2.2.4. Research Objective Ⅳ: Examining Effects of PACs on Competition  
Due to the fourth gap in knowledge, the fourth research objective of this study is to 
empirically analyze the effects that offering PACs has on competition among bidders for 
transportation projects. This can help capital planners and transportation agencies 
systematically evaluate the actual effects that offering PACs has on competition among 
bidders. 
2.3. Research Methodology 
This dissertation aims to address the four presented research objectives in four 
separate sections. The research methodology for each research objective is presented in 
this section briefly and will be discussed in full detail in the corresponding chapters.  
To address the first research objective, modeling and forecasting of fluctuations in 
asphalt cement price, a univariate time series analysis is conducted. First, historical records 
of asphalt cement price are collected. Second, variations in asphalt cement price over time 
are identified and characterized. Then, based on the identified time series characteristics, 
univariate time series forecasting models, such as Holt Exponential Smoothing (ES), Holt-
Winters ES, autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA), and seasonal ARIMA, 
are created to take into account the short-term variation in asphalt cement price in 
forecasting its future values. Next, diagnostics tests including residual analysis are 
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conducted to validate the applicability of the models. Finally, out-of-sample forecasting is 
performed to measure the predictability of the developed forecasting models. 
The second research objective, quantifying and forecasting uncertainties in the 
price of asphalt cement, is addressed using autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH) and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) time 
series volatility models. In the first step, the univariate time series models developed for 
the first research objective are fitted to the time series of asphalt cement price to capture 
the conditional mean of asphalt cement price over time. Next, the residuals of the model 
are examined using a heteroscedasticity test to check if the volatility in the price of asphalt 
cement is statistically significant. If heteroscedasticity exists, ARCH/GARCH models are 
created, and the conditional volatility of asphalt cement price is measured and modeled 
over time. The conditional volatility models then are validated and their predictability is 
evaluated.  
Contractors’ submitted bid data from 841 highway projects awarded in the state of 
Georgia were collected and used to investigate the third research objective, empirical 
assessment of the effects of PACs on submitted bid prices. A literature review and 
interviews with transportation cost professionals are conducted to identify a potential list 
of explanatory variables for modeling the variation in contractors’ submitted bid prices. 
The dataset and identified potential explanatory variables, including a binary variable for 
the availability of PAC for a project, are used to create multivariate linear regression 
models to explain variations in submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in 
transportation projects. Diagnostic tests such as analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
residual analysis are conducted to check the validity of the models. Finally, the binary 
26 
 
variable showing the availability of PAC for a project is checked for statistical significance 
in the models. 
To address the fourth research objective, empirical assessment of the effect of PACs 
on competition among bidders, historical records of the average number of bidders and 
dispersion of submitted bid prices are monitored over time using system monitoring 
processes to check whether their variations statistically changed after the introduction of 
the PAC program. To analyze the effects of PACs on the number of bidders, two variables 
are investigated: 1) the average number of bidders per project; and 2) the number of unique 
contractors divided by the number of projects for each month. The cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) system monitoring method combined with time series analysis is used to check 
whether these two variables statistically changed after the introduction of the PAC 
program. Furthermore, a standard deviation control chart with variable sample size is used 
to check whether the dispersion of the submitted bid prices changed after PACs were 
offered. 
Figure 2-1 shows the overall research methodology used to achieve the research objectives 




Figure 2-1: Overall research methodology 
 
2.4. Dissertation Organization 
To achieve these research objectives, the remainder of this dissertation is structured 
as follows. Chapter three addresses the first objective. Historical records of asphalt cement 
price are analyzed and characterized to develop univariate time series forecasting models 
to predict the future price of asphalt cement.  
The second research objective of this dissertation is addressed in the fourth chapter. 
Volatility and level of uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement is measured, modeled, and 
predicted using ARCH and GARCH time series models.  
Empirical analysis of the impact that offering PACs has on submitted bid prices is 
presented in chapter five. Multivariate regression analysis was used to explain variations 
in submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in transportation projects and to identify 
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statistically significant explanatory variables (including the availability of PACs) that 
affect submitted bid prices.  
Chapter six presents the empirical analysis, using system monitoring processes, of 
the effects that offering PACs has on the level of competition. Finally, chapter seven 
concludes the research work presented in this dissertation and suggests possible future 




CHAPTER 3: MODELING AND FORECASTING ASPHALT 
CEMENT PRICE 
3.1. Introduction 
The ability to properly forecast asphalt cement price results in more accurate cost 
estimations and a decreased level of uncertainty and financial risks. This study departs from 
the existing body of knowledge and challenges the lack of proper treatment of short-term 
variations in predicting asphalt cement price. The price of asphalt cement over time is 
autocorrelated time series data that can be analyzed, and its major characteristics can be 
identified for use in forecasting its future values. The research objectives of this chapter 
are to (a) identify and characterize the variations observed in the actual price of asphalt 
cement over time; and (b) use this knowledge to create time series forecasting models for 
asphalt cement price and check if time series forecasting models can predict future values 
of asphalt cement more accurately than existing approaches. To achieve these research 
objectives, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. After a brief literature 
review of forecasting models, the proposed research approach and steps conducted in this 
study are described. Then the time series dataset of the asphalt cement price index is 
introduced, and its major characteristics (i.e., autocorrelation, stationarity, and seasonality) 
are investigated. Based on the identified characteristics, four univariate time series 
forecasting models, Holt ES, Holt-Winters ES, ARIMA, and seasonal ARIMA, are created 
to take into account the short-term variations in asphalt cement price when forecasting its 
future values. Diagnostic tests, such as goodness of fit and residual analysis, are conducted 
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to measure the accuracy and verify that the underlying conditions hold true for each 
developed model. The predictability of each time series model is evaluated and compared 
to previously existing methods using an out-of-sample forecasting process. Finally, 
conclusions and future work are presented.  
3.2. Forecasting Models 
Forecasting models can be classified into the two categories of causal models and 
time series models (Taylor and Bowen 1987). Casual models, such as linear regression 
models, forecast a variable using independent explanatory variables. These models are 
widely applied in the construction area. For example, Persad et al. (1995) used regression 
models to forecast engineering manpower requirements for highway preconstruction 
activities. Christian and Pandeya (1997) predicted the operation and maintenance costs of 
facilities using regression models. Lowe et al. (2006) developed linear regression models 
to predict the construction cost of buildings in the United Kingdom; they considered forty-
one potential explanatory variables to predict the cost. Sonmez et al. (2007) used regression 
analysis to develop a model to predict cost contingency in international projects using 
fourteen potential independent factors. Abu Hammad et al. (2010) created a probabilistic 
regression model to predict the cost of public building projects using several explanatory 
factors, such as project area and project duration. Heravi and Ilbeigi (2012) developed a 
multivariate model to quantify and forecast project success using eleven explanatory 
variables. Behmardi et al. (2013) developed and compared the performance of a linear 
mixture model and a Bayesian model to predict the cost of bridge replacement in Oregon 
using the structural characteristics of the bridges. Ilbeigi et al. (2015a) identified and 
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considered fifteen potential explanatory variables to model and forecast variations in 
submitted bid prices for pavement line items in highway construction projects.  
Contrary to the widespread application of causal models, in some cases, it may be 
very difficult to identify, quantify, and predict the explanatory variables, especially when 
the model requires economic-related explanatory variables (Ashuri and Lu 2010). Because 
asphalt cement is a petroleum product, too many factors related to different areas, such as 
market conditions, social and political issues, technology, and economic growth, may 
affect its price. Accurately identifying, quantifying, and predicting future values of all 
explanatory variables to model and forecast the future price of asphalt cement may not be 
a feasible solution in the real world. In this situation, univariate time series forecasting 
models are a powerful alternative to causal models. 
Univariate time series models determine the future values of a variable based only 
on its previous records and observations. A time series forecasting model identifies 
meaningful characteristics in the history of the variable and predicts future values based on 
those characteristics and prior observations. A univariate time series forecasting model 
only requires one input for creating and calibrating the model, an important feature that has 
resulted in widespread application of these models. For example, Hwang and Liu (2009) 
used time series forecasting models to predict short-term productivity in construction 
operations. Ashuri and Lu (2010) created univariate time series forecasting models to 
predict the Engineering News Records (ENR) Construction Cost Index (CCI). Xu and 
Moon (2011) used a cointegrated vector autoregression (VAR) time series model to 
forecast the trend of the construction cost index. Shahandashti and Ashuri (2015) 
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forecasted the highway construction cost index using vector error correction time series 
models. 
Considering the significant capabilities of time series forecasting models to predict 
the future values of a variable based only on its historical records, in this study, univariate 
time series forecasting models are used to model the variations in asphalt cement price over 
time and predict its future values. 
3.3. Research Methodology 
The historical prices of asphalt cement are time series in nature. Time series are 
subject to specific properties, such as autocorrelation, stationarity, and seasonality. 
Statistical time series methods are used to identify and characterize the main properties of 
historical asphalt cement prices. After identifying the main characteristics of the asphalt 
cement time series data, in-sample model fitting is conducted to create four time series 
models for predicting asphalt cement price. Residual analysis tests are conducted to verify 
whether the underlying conditions of the created time series models hold true. Goodness-
of-fit tests are performed to determine the applicability of the created time series models 
for forecasting asphalt cement price. Finally, out-of-sample forecasting is conducted to 
evaluate the predictability of the developed models compared to the previously existing 





Figure 3-1: Process of time series analysis, model development, and predictability evaluation 
 
3.4. Dataset 
In this study, the monthly asphalt cement price index in the state of Georgia is 
analyzed and used to develop the forecasting model. GDOT determines the asphalt cement 
price index based on the average price of asphalt cement from the department’s monthly 
survey of approved asphalt cement suppliers. The maximum and minimum prices are 
excluded from the calculation of the index. The dataset consists of 228 observations of the 
asphalt cement price index in Georgia from January 1996 to December 2014 (Figure 1-1). 
Observations from January 1996 to December 2013 are considered for in-sample model 
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fitting and parameter estimation. The last twelve observations (i.e., from January 2014 to 
December 2014) are used for out-of-sample forecasting and predictability evaluation. 
3.5. Time Series Analysis 
The results of the Ljung-Box Q test (Ljung and Box 1978) ( 
Table 3-1) specify that the time series of the asphalt cement price index is 
autocorrelated (i.e., the correlations between the values of the series at different time lags 
are statistically significant), indicating that variations in the asphalt cement price index are 
not random and depend on the index’s past values. Therefore, use of time series analysis 
to explain variations in the asphalt cement price index is meaningful, and time series 
forecasting models for the asphalt cement price index can be created. 
One of the most important characteristics of a time series is stationarity. Although 
the graph of the asphalt cement price index (Figure 1-1) shows an upward trend, indicating 
the potential for a non-stationary time series, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Fuller 
1976) test is conducted to investigate the non-stationary property of the price index more 
rigorously. The resulting ADF test statistic is –0.1424 with a p-value of 0.63, indicating 
that the null hypothesis that the time series of asphalt cement price index is non-stationary 
cannot be rejected. 
Another important characteristic of a time series is seasonality. Figure 3-2 shows 
the box plot of the monthly asphalt cement price index. The plot does not show a very 




Table 3-1: Results of the Ljung-Box Q test 
Lag Autocorrelation Q-Statistic P-Value 
1 0.985 219.20 0.000 
2 0.961 428.97 0.000 
3 0.933 627.60 0.000 
4 0.904 814.67 0.000 
5 0.876 991.32 0.000 
6 0.852 1159.3 0.000 
7 0.831 1319.8 0.000 
8 0.814 1474.5 0.000 
9 0.802 1625.1 0.000 
10 0.791 1772.6 0.000 
11 0.784 1917.9 0.000 
12 0.776 2061.2 0.000 
13 0.768 2202.2 0.000 
14 0.760 2341.0 0.000 
15 0.753 2477.8 0.000 
16 0.746 2612.7 0.000 
17 0.740 2746.2 0.000 
18 0.734 2878.2 0.000 
19 0.727 3008.2 0.000 
20 0.719 3136.2 0.000 
 
Figure 3-2: Box plot of monthly asphalt cement price index 
 
Furthermore, Figure 3-3 (a) and (b) show autocorrelation function (ACF) plots of 
the original time series of the asphalt cement price index and the ACF of the time series 
after removing the trend. The ACF plots do not display any apparent cyclical behaviors. 
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Thus, no seasonal pattern in the asphalt cement price index is evident. However, during the 
creation of the models, we will check whether considering seasonal factors improves the 
forecasting models.  
 
 
3.5.1. In-Sample Model Fitting 
Considering the identified characteristics, Holt ES, Holt-Winters ES, ARIMA, and 
seasonal ARIMA models are applied to the asphalt cement price index. After estimating 
the parameters and fitting the models, mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), mean 
square error (MSE), and mean absolute error (MAE) are used to measure and compare the 
goodness-of-fit of the models. 
3.5.1.1. Holt ES 
Holt ES is designed for modeling non-stationary time series (Holt 2004). The Holt 
ES model consists of two parameters: mean smoothing parameters (α) and trend smoothing 
parameters (β). Parameter α estimates the monthly mean of the variable, and parameter β 
Figure 3-3: (a) ACF plot of the original time series of asphalt cement price index; (b) ACF plot of the 
time series after removing the trend 
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estimates the monthly trend factor or growth rate of the variable (Gardner 1985). These 
parameters are estimated using a recursive approach to minimize the sum of squared errors. 
The optimal value of α and β are estimated at 1 and 0.64, respectively. The sum of squared 
errors is 124245.6. The three error measures of the Holt ES model are calculated as follows: 
MAPE=5.68%, MSE=557.88, and MAE=14.11. 
3.5.1.2. Holt-Winters ES 
Winters (1960) developed the Holt-Winters ES model based on the Holt ES 
method. The Holt-Winters ES model is recommended for time series data that display trend 
and seasonality. Holt-Winters ES has a seasonal smoothing parameter (γ) in addition to 
mean and trend smoothing parameters (i.e., α and β). Although there is no strong evidence 
for seasonality in the time series of the asphalt cement price index, the Holt-Winters ES 
method is applied to check whether including the seasonality parameter could improve the 
model. Similar to the Holt ES model, the parameters are estimated using a recursive 
approach. The optimal values of the parameters are α=0.9515, β=0.00457, and γ=1. The 
sum of squared errors is 151074.9, which is considerably larger than the sum of squared 
errors with the Holt ES model. The three error measures to check the goodness-of-fit for 
the Holt-Winters ES are as follows: MAPE=6.44%, MSE=736.95, and MAE=16.70. All of 
the error measures are larger than those of the Holt ES model.  
3.5.1.3. ARIMA 
ARIMA models are designed based on the combination of autoregressive (AR) and 
moving average (MA). An ARIMA model consists of three parameters: p, q, and d. 
Parameters p and q are integers that describe the order of AR and MA in the model. 
Parameter d represents the difference order required to transform the original dataset to a 
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stationary time series. Because the original time series of the asphalt cement price index is 
non-stationary, the first step to create the ARIMA model is to transfer the original dataset 
to a stationary time series. In this manner, the differencing operator of order one can be 
applied to the original dataset. However, some useful information and some data points 
might be lost during the differencing process (Diebold 1998). A better alternative to 
differencing is to include the trend variable in the model. The trend is captured using an 
integer variable that starts at one for the first month and increases incrementally by one 
unit afterward. The ADF test is conducted to check if capturing the trend makes the series 
stationary. The t-statistic of the ADF test after capturing the trend is –4.685167 with a p-
value of 0.0010, indicating that the null hypothesis of the index being non-stationary is 
strongly rejected; the series is stationary if the trend is included in the model. Furthermore, 
to capture any possible seasonal pattern, twelve dummy variables representing each month 
are added into the model. Thus, the equation of the ARIMA model for the time series of 
the asphalt cement price index is as follows: 











p is the order of the AR operator 
q is the order of the MA operator 
d is the differencing order, which is equal to 0 in our case 
c is the intercept 
α is the coefficient of the trend 
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φi is the coefficient of the i
th AR operator 
θj is the coefficient of the j
th MA operator 
Mk is a dummy variable that is 1 if the observation belongs to month k and 0 otherwise 
βk is the coefficient of the binary variable of month k 
The optimal values of p and q are determined based on the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1998) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 
1978). To select the proper model, different models with various combinations of p and q 
were studied. The coefficients of the model are determined using maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE). The results indicate that the ARIMA(2,0,2) produces the lowest AIC and 
BIC, equal to 8.81 and 8.91, respectively. In this study, the significance level is considered 
equal to 5%. Because the p-values of the intercept, MA(1), and all monthly binary variables 
except the variables for May and August are considerably higher than the significance 
level, they are not statistically significant and can be removed from the model. Table 3-2 
shows the results of the model.  
 
Table 3-2: Results of the ARIMA(2,0,2) model 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic P-Value 
Trend 2.6928 22.4296 0.0000 
AR(1) 1.3799 22.8986 0.0000 
AR(2) –0.4840 –8.1334 0.0000 
MA(2) 0.2060 2936.12 0.0000 
M5 5.8911 2.2167 0.0277 
M8 5.5038 2.0729 0.0394 
 
The final equation of the ARIMA model can be represented as follows: 
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𝐴𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡̂ = 2.6928×𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 1.3799×𝐴𝑅(1) − 0.4840×𝐴𝑅(2) + 0.2060×𝑀𝐴(2)
+ 5.8911×𝑀5 + 5.5038×𝑀8 
The three error measures of the ARIMA model are MAPE=5.96%, MSE=373.71, and 
MAE=12.82. All the error measures are lower than the error measures of the Holt ES and the 
Holt-Winters ES models, indicating that the ARIMA model has better goodness-of-fit than the 
Holt family models. Figure 3-4 shows the graph of the actual, fitted, and residuals of the 
ARIMA model.  
 
 









































The key underlying condition of the ARIMA models is that the residual must follow 
a white noise process with a mean of 0 and finite variance. Figure 3-5 shows the 
correlogram of the residuals, and Table 3-3 shows the results of the Ljung-Box Q test. 
Because the p-values for all lag levels are higher than the significance level of 5%, the null 
hypothesis that the data are independently distributed cannot be rejected. Thus, the 
residuals do not show any serial correlation and can be considered a white noise process. 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Correlogram of the residuals of the ARIMA(2,0,2) model 
 
3.5.1.4. Seasonal ARIMA 
Although the potential seasonality pattern was captured using dummy variables in 
the ARIMA model, another approach is to use a seasonal ARIMA model, which is an 
extended version of the ARIMA model. In addition to the parameters p, q, and d, which 
are required to create a regular ARIMA model, a seasonal ARIMA model uses parameters 
P, Q, and D to capture potential seasonality. Parameters P and Q describe the orders of the  
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Table 3-3: Results of the Ljung-Box Q test for the residuals of the ARIMA(2,0,2) model 
Lag Autocorrelation Q-Statistic P-Value 
1 –0.012 0.0330  
2 –0.021 0.1283  
3 0.071 1.2763  
4 –0.030 1.4812 0.224 
5 –0.106 4.0581 0.131 
6 0.100 6.3503 0.096 
7 0.026 6.5089 0.164 
8 –0.144 11.283 0.046 
9 0.031 11.510 0.074 
10 –0.058 12.308 0.091 
11 –0.002 12.309 0.138 
12 0.119 15.620 0.075 
13 0.034 15.900 0.103 
14 –0.036 16.208 0.134 
15 –0.030 16.428 0.172 
16 0.005 16.433 0.227 
17 0.024 16.575 0.280 
18 0.036 16.888 0.326 
19 0.053 17.562 0.350 
20 0.023 17.691 0.409 
 
seasonal autoregressive (SAR) and the seasonal moving average (SMA) in the model, 
respectively. Parameter D is the difference order required to remove the seasonality of the 
transformed stationary dataset. Because the seasonality pattern was not obvious in the box 
plot diagram, various seasonal ARIMA models with different values for parameter D are 
tested. Parameter d is set to 0 because, similar to the ARIMA model, the original dataset is 
transferred to a stationary time series by including a trend variable in the model. The 
equation of the seasonal ARIMA model for the time series of the asphalt cement price 
index is as follows: 
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𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐴(𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑞)(𝑃, 𝐷, 𝑄)














P is the order of the SAR operator 
Q is the order of the SMA operator 
D is the differencing order required to remove the seasonality 
λk is the coefficient of the k
th SAR operator 
δl is the coefficient of the l
th SMA operator 
The initial values of the parameters p, q, P, and Q are determined based on the AIC 
and BIC values. Various combinations of the parameters are considered to identify the 
proper models. The coefficients of the model are determined using MLE.  
Similar to ARIMA models, the key underlying condition of the seasonal ARIMA 
models is that the residual must follow a white noise process with a mean of 0 and finite 
variance. Analyzing various combinations of the parameters indicates that several models, 
such as seasonal ARIMA(1,0,12)(1,1,0), produce relatively low AIC and BIC. However, 
the simplest model with low AIC and BIC that satisfies the underlying condition of the 
residuals following a white noise process is the seasonal ARIMA(2,0,2)(8,0,5). The AIC 
and BIC of this model are 8.78 and 8.88, respectively. Table 3-4 shows the results of the 
seasonal ARIMA(2,0,2)(8,0,5). In Table 3-4, those variables that are not statistically 
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significant within the 5% significance level are removed from the results. Figure 3-6 shows 
the graph of the actual, fitted, and residuals of the seasonal ARIMA(2,0,2)(8,0,5) model.  
 
Table 3-4: Results of the seasonal ARIMA(2,0,2)(8,0,5) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic P-Value 
Trend 2.6960 22.0585 0.0000 
AR(1) 1.3470 19.2658 0.0000 
AR(2) –0.4123 –5.9075 0.0000 
SAR(8) –0.1869 –2.6558 0.0085 
MA(2) 0.1887 2.4773 0.0141 
SMA(5) –0.2215 –2.9086 0.0040 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Actual, fitted, and residuals of the seasonal ARIMA(2,0,2)(8,0,5) model 
 
Figure 3-7 shows the correlogram and Table 3-5 shows the results of the Ljung-Box Q test 








































that the data are independently distributed cannot be rejected. Thus, the residuals can be 
considered a white noise process. 
 
Table 3-5: Results of the Ljung-Box Q test for the residuals of the seasonal ARIMA(2,0,2)(8,0,5) 
model 
Lag Autocorrelation Q-Statistic P-Value 
1 0.013 0.0351  
2 –0.023 0.1501  
3 0.029 0.3310  
4 –0.111 2.9613  
5 0.023 3.0713  
6 0.065 3.9738 0.046 
7 –0.023 4.0842 0.130 
8 –0.013 4.1211 0.249 
9 0.006 4.1280 0.389 
10 –0.101 6.3819 0.271 
11 –0.014 6.4231 0.377 
12 0.127 9.9949 0.189 
13 0.013 10.030 0.263 
14 –0.075 11.288 0.257 
15 –0.005 11.293 0.335 
16 –0.062 12.165 0.351 
17 0.024 12.294 0.422 
18 0.066 13.298 0.425 
19 0.017 13.363 0.498 
20 0.030 13.569 0.558 
 
 




The three error measures of the seasonal ARIMA model are MAPE=5.52%, 
MSE=371.21, and MAE=12.41. All the error measures are slightly lower than those of the 
ARIMA(2,0,2) model. 
3.5.2. Validation: Out-of-Sample Forecasting 
After creating the time series forecasting models and evaluating their goodness-of-
fit, out-of-sample forecasting can be conducted to evaluate the predictability of the models 
and validate the results. As noted earlier, a subset of the first 216 observations from January 
1996 to December 2013 was used to create and calibrate the models. Now, using the time 
series forecasting models, the asphalt cement price index from January 2014 to December 
2014 is forecasted. By comparing the forecast values with the actual values, the 
predictability of the models is evaluated. 
The three error measures (i.e., MAPE, MSE, and MAE) are used to analyze the 
predictability of the models more rigorously. Table 3-6 shows the out-of-sample 
forecasting error measures of the time series models. The results indicate that all developed 
time series models can predict the price of asphalt cement properly with errors of less than 
4%. Among the four models, the Holt ES and ARIMA models are the most accurate, with 
less than 2% error. 
 
Table 3-6: Out-of-sample forecasting error measures 
Model MAPE MSE MAE 
Holt ES 1.62% 147.67 9.50 
ARIMA 1.94% 222.92 11.11 
Seasonal ARIMA 2.15% 253.68 12.34 




Figure 3-8 shows the results of the out-of-sample forecasting analysis. Because the out-of-
sample forecasting process uses the forecast values of the lagged data points, the forecast 
errors tend to compound over time and result in larger errors (cumulative error).  
 
 
Figure 3-8: Out-of-sample forecast of asphalt cement price index 
 
Overall, Figure 3-8 shows that the forecast values are closer to the actual values for 
the early points in the out-of-sample period and gradually depart from the actual values 
due to the cumulative error. Therefore, all models have better predictability for early points 
in the out-of-sample forecasting period. The results of the out-of-sample forecasting 
validate the applicability of the developed time series models for predicting the future 





































3.6. Predictability of Time Series Models versus Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
As noted in the introduction section, Monte Carlo simulation has been widely used 
to predict the cost of projects. Among the existing approaches, such as adding a fixed 
percentage of the total cost as a risk premium or inflating the estimated cost of materials to 
the expected midpoint of the construction period, the Monte Carlo approach is the only 
method capable of modeling short-term variations in asphalt cement price. However, the 
predictability of this method depends significantly on the accuracy of the input 
distributions; furthermore, this method does not consider the effects of autocorrelation in 
the historical records of asphalt cement price. Conversely, time series forecasting models 
are independent of any assumption or fitted distributions, and their only input is the actual 
historical price of asphalt cement. Furthermore, time series models can capture the effects 
of autocorrelation in the price of asphalt cement appropriately. In this section, a Monte 
Carlo simulation model is developed to forecast the future values of asphalt cement price, 
and the results are compared to those of the developed time series forecasting models. 
Figure 3-9 shows the histogram of the escalation rates in the history of asphalt 
cement price. In the current state of practice, fitting a triangular distribution to the 
histogram is recommended (Back et al. 2000). The mode parameter, lower boundary, and 
upper boundary parameters of the fitted triangular distribution are estimated to equal 
0.00355, –0.31063, and 0.29873, respectively. The primary value of asphalt cement price 
is set to the actual price in December 2013 (i.e., $575). 
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A simulation process is conducted to generate future random paths of the price of 
asphalt cement from January 2014 to December 2014; Figure 3-10 shows the generated 
random paths. Each path is a possible scenario for the future value of asphalt cement during 
the out-of-sample forecasting period.  
 
 
Figure 3-9: Histogram of escalation rates in the history of asphalt cement price 
 
More than 100,000 random paths are generated during the simulation process, and 
the means of the simulated future values of asphalt cement at each time point during the 
out-of-sample period are calculated. Figure 3-11 shows the expected values of future 
asphalt cement price as calculated by Monte Carlo simulation and compares them to the 








































































































































































The results of the simulation process indicate that the MAPE, MSE, and MAE of 
the Monte Carlo model are 3.64%, 827.89, and 21.47, respectively. All three error 
measures are higher for the Monte Carlo simulation than for all of the developed time series 
models. To analyze the predictability of the Monte Carlo simulation for asphalt cement 
price more rigorously, thirty-four other distributions, including normal, log normal, 
gamma, beta, Cauchy, and Weibull distribution, were fitted to the histogram of the price 
escalation rates. The results show that a Cauchy distribution with mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 0.02563 has the best goodness-of-fit. Using the Cauchy distribution instead of 
the triangular distribution improves the predictability of the Monte Carlo simulation with 
a MAPE of 2.26%. However, three out of the four developed time series models, Holt ES, 
ARIMA, and seasonal ARIMA, still have better predictability compared to the Monte 
Carlo simulation using the Cauchy distribution. It should be noted that time series 
forecasting models are faster and computationally less expensive than the Monte Carlo 
simulation as well. 
3.7. Summary 
The typical existing methods for modeling asphalt cement price (i.e., adding a fixed 
percentage of the total estimated cost as the risk premium or inflating the estimated cost of 
materials to the expected midpoint of the construction period) do not explicitly take into 
account that the price of asphalt cement is subject to significant variations, even over a 
short period of time. A more advanced alternative, Monte Carlo simulation, has been 
widely used to quantify the range and likelihood of project cost. However, Monte Carlo 
simulation cannot consider the effects of autocorrelation in the price of asphalt cement 
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when forecasting its future values, and the simulation’s predictability depends heavily on 
the accuracy of the input distributions.  
On the contrary, univariate time series forecasting models forecast a variable using 
only its historical observations and can properly capture the effects of autocorrelation in 
the time series of a variable to predict its future values. In this empirical study, the time 
series of asphalt cement price is analyzed, and its major characteristics are identified. The 
results of this empirical study show that the time series data of asphalt cement price is 
autocorrelated, non-stationary, and does not have a very strong seasonal pattern. Based on 
the identified time series characteristics, four univariate time series forecasting models, 
Holt ES, Holt-Winters ES, ARIMA, and seasonal ARIMA, were created to take into 
account the short-term variations in asphalt cement price in forecasting its future values. 
The results of in-sample model fitting show that all four models have proper goodness-of-
fit. Residual analysis reveals that the underlying conditions of the models hold true, and, 
therefore, these time series models are usable. The results of the out-of-sample forecasting 
show that all four time series models can predict the future value of asphalt cement price 
with proper accuracy, but the ARIMA and Holt ES models are the most accurate among 
the four with less than 2% error. Furthermore, the results of this study show that time series 
forecasting models can predict the future values of asphalt cement more accurately 
compared to the previously existing methods, including Monte Carlo simulation.  
This chapter makes two primary contributions to the existing body of knowledge: 
(1) a characterization of the variations in asphalt cement prices over time; and (2) the 
creation of univariate time series forecasting models to predict future values of asphalt 
cement prices. The results of this study can help both owners and contractors improve 
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budgeting processes, prepare more accurate cost estimates, and reduce the risk of asphalt 
cement price variations in transportation projects. Although this study was conducted using 
the state of Georgia’s asphalt cement price index, the proposed methodology can be used 
for similar datasets in other states and internationally. 
As observed in the validation section, because the out-of-sample forecasting 
process uses the forecast values of the lagged data points, the forecast errors tend to 
compound over time, resulting in larger errors. Therefore, univariate time series forecasting 
models may not perform well for long-term predictions. A potential solution to this 
limitation of univariate time series forecasting models is to create multivariate time series 
models that use historical records of the price of asphalt cement in addition to the historical 
records of several other variables (i.e., leading indicators). Identifying the time series 
leading indicators of asphalt cement price and creating multivariate time series forecasting 
models for this price could be a basis for future works. Furthermore, developing and 
evaluating risk management strategies and hedging mechanisms to control the 




CHAPTER 4: QUANTIFYING AND FORECASTING UNCERTAINTY 
IN THE PRICE OF ASPHALT CEMENT 
4.1. Introduction 
Before using any risk management strategy, it is necessary to measure, analyze, and 
forecast material price uncertainty and ensure that it is the proper time to employ the 
strategy. This chapter addresses the second research objective of this dissertation: 
quantifying and forecasting uncertainties in the price of asphalt cement. To achieve this 
objective, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. After a brief introduction 
to ARCH and GARCH time series volatility models, the time series dataset of the asphalt 
cement price index is introduced. The proposed research approach and steps conducted in 
this study then are described. In the first step, a univariate time series model is fitted to the 
asphalt cement price index time series to capture the conditional mean of asphalt cement 
price over time. Next, the residuals of the model are examined by a heteroscedasticity test 
to check whether the volatility in the price of asphalt cement is statistically significant. If 
heteroscedasticity exists, ARCH/GARCH models are created, and the conditional volatility 
of asphalt cement price is measured and modeled over time. The conditional volatility 
models then are validated, and their predictability is evaluated. Finally, conclusions and 
suggestions for future work are presented. This study’s primary contribution to the existing 
body of knowledge is systematically measuring and forecasting uncertainties in the price 
of asphalt cement over time. The results of this study can help transportation agencies 
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properly analyze asphalt cement price uncertainty and subsequently wisely implement their 
risk management strategies at the proper time. 
4.2. ARCH/GARCH Volatility Models 
The uncertainty (i.e., unpredictability) of a variable can be quantified based on the 
concept of conditional volatility, which is defined by the variance of the error term (Engle 
1982). Equation 1 shows a general regression model that can be used to estimate the price 
of asphalt cement. 
𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
Where: 
ACPt is asphalt cement at time t 
mt is the conditional mean function or the mean value of asphalt cement price at time t 
et is the error term at time t and is distributed normally with a mean of 0 and variance of 
σ2t 
Regular models simply assume that the variance of the error (i.e., σ2t) is constant 
over time (i.e., homogeneity of variance) and that the deviations of the actual observations 
from the conditional mean calculated by the model follow a white noise process. In other 
words, the unpredictability of the response variable (i.e., asphalt cement price) is constant 
through time. However, this assumption is not valid in many cases (Engle 1982; Enders 
2008). 
In 1982, Engle observed that even if the residuals of a model follow the white noise 
process, their squared values might be autocorrelated. Based on this interesting 
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observation, he defined ARCH(L1) to model conditional volatility (i.e., conditional 
variance), which depends upon the information available through time t as a function of 
the square of the residuals as follows: 
𝜎𝑡





∀𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐿1  𝛼𝑖 , 𝜔 > 0 
Where: 
ω is a constant 
L1 is the number of lags 
αi is the coefficient of the i
th observation in the window of L1 lags 
ei is the residual of the regression model at time i 
In some cases, the ARCH model requires long lag lengths to capture the impact of 
historical observations on current volatility (Danielsson 2011). To address this issue, 
Bollerslev (1986) introduced the generalized version of the ARCH model, GARCH(L1,L2), 
which incorporates the impact of historical conditional volatilities in addition to historical 
observations to estimate current volatility as follows: 
𝜎𝑡









∀𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐿1  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐿2     𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑗 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔 > 0 
Where: 
L2 is the number of lags for historical conditional volatilities 
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βj is the coefficient of the j
th conditional volatility in the window of L2 lags 
σj is the conditional volatility at time j 
If L2 is equal to 0 in a GARCH model, it produces the same result as an ARCH model. The 
coefficients of the ARCH/GARCH models are estimated using MLE. 
The majority of the volatility models applied to real world problems belong to the 
ARCH/GARCH family (Danielsson 2011). Vilasuso (2002) used GARCH models to 
forecast currency exchange rate volatility. Karmakar (2005) developed GARCH models to 
estimate the conditional volatility of Indian stock markets. Joukar and Nahmens (2015) 
modeled the volatility of the ENR construction cost index using ARCH/GARCH models. 
Ilbeigi et al. (2016c) used GARCH models to improve forecasting of asphalt cement price 
index.  
4.3. Dataset 
In this study, the monthly asphalt cement price index in the state of Georgia is used 
to measure, model, and forecast uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement. GDOT 
determines the asphalt cement price index based on the average of the asphalt cement prices 
from the department’s monthly survey of approved asphalt cement suppliers. The 
maximum and minimum prices are excluded from the calculation of the index. The dataset 
consists of 229 observations from January 1996 to January 2015 (Figure 1-1). In this study, 
observations from January 1996 to December 2013 are considered for model creation, in-
sample model fitting, and parameter estimation. The last twelve observations (i.e., from 




4.4. Research Methodology 
In this study, ARCH/GARCH time series models are used to quantify and forecast 
uncertainties in the price of asphalt cement. As noted in the previous sections, uncertainty 
is defined as the variance of the error terms in a model that explains the variations in the 
mean of the historical observations (Engle 1982). Therefore, the first step of modeling 
uncertainties is to create the mean model, which is also called the conditional mean 
function. The conditional mean function can be any regular time series model, such as 
autoregressive moving average (ARMA), ARIMA, or seasonal ARIMA, that satisfies the 
underlying assumptions (e.g., the residuals of the model follow a white noise process) 
(Danielsson 2011). The error terms then are calculated, and the variation of their variances 
(i.e., volatility) is checked for statistical significance (i.e., heteroscedasticity). If 
heteroscedasticity exists (i.e., volatility is statistically significant), the ARCH/GARCH 
models are created and their parameters are estimated. Next, the ARCH/GARCH model is 
validated by conducting the heteroscedasticity test (ARCH test) on its residuals to make 
sure the model has captured the variations of the volatility properly. In other words, for the 
model to be acceptable, the variation of the variances of the residuals in the 
ARCH/GARCH model should not be statistically significant. Furthermore, the estimated 
volatilities using the ARCH/GARCH model are compared with the realized volatilities to 
evaluate the performance of the model more rigorously. Finally, out-of-sample forecasting 
is conducted to predict the future values of volatility and evaluate the predictability of the 
model.  
In summary, the following steps are applied to measure, model, and forecast the 
volatility of the asphalt cement price index: 
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1- Creating conditional mean function  
2- Heteroscedasticity testing on the residuals of the mean function to check whether 
the volatility is statistically significant 
3- Creating ARCH/GARCH models if heteroscedasticity exists 
4- Heteroscedasticity testing on the residuals of the ARCH/GARCH model to validate 
the model 
5- Measuring conditional volatility using the created ARCH/GARCH model 
6- Evaluating the model by comparing the estimated volatilities with realized 
volatilities 
7- Conducting out-of-sample forecasting for conditional volatility 
Figure 4-1 shows the process to quantify, model, and forecast uncertainties in asphalt 
cement price. 
 
Figure 4-1: Process to quantify, model, and forecast uncertainties in asphalt cement price 
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4.5. Volatility Model Development 
As noted before, the development of a volatility model consists of three major steps: 
(1) creating the conditional mean function, (2) conducting heteroscedasticity tests to check 
whether the volatility is statistically significant, and (3) creating ARCH/GARCH models.  
4.5.1. Creating the Conditional Mean Function 
Because the uncertainty of the asphalt cement price index is defined as the variance 
of the errors of the conditional mean function (mt), the first step in analyzing volatility is 
to create the conditional mean function. Ilbeigi et al. (2016a) proposed different types of 
univariate time series models for the asphalt cement price index and showed that an 
Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) with a trend and an intercept variable can 
properly fit to the data and forecast future values of the asphalt cement price index.  
The ARMA model consists of two parameters: p and q. These are integers that 
describe the order of AR and MA in the model. Because the original time series of the 
asphalt cement price index is non-stationary, its trend is captured in the model by using an 
integer variable that starts at 1 for the first month and increases incrementally by one unit 
afterward. Furthermore, to capture any possible seasonal pattern, twelve dummy variables 
representing each month are added into the model. Thus, the equation of the ARMA model 
for the time series of the asphalt cement price index is as follows: 











p is the order of the AR operator 
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q is the order of the MA operator 
c is the intercept 
α is the coefficient of the trend 
φi is the coefficient of the i
th AR operator 
θj is the coefficient of the j
th MA operator 
Mk is a dummy variable that is 1 if the observation belongs to month k and 0 otherwise 
βk is the coefficient of the binary variable of month k 
Optimal values for p and q are determined based on the AIC (Akaike 1998) and the 
BIC (Schwarz 1978). To select the proper model, different models with various 
combinations of p and q are studied. Model coefficients are determined using MLE. Results 
indicate that the ARMA(2,2) produces the lowest AIC and BIC, equal to 8.81 and 8.91, 
respectively. The significance level is considered equal to 5%. Because the p-values of the 
intercept, MA(1), and all monthly binary variables except those for May and August are 
considerably higher than the significance level, they are not statistically significant and can 
be removed from the model. Table 4-1 shows the results of the model.  
 
Table 4-1: Results of the ARMA(2,2) model 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic P-Value 
Trend 2.6928 22.4296 0.0000 
AR(1) 1.3799 22.8986 0.0000 
AR(2) –0.4840 –8.1334 0.0000 
MA(2) 0.2060 2936.12 0.0000 
M5 5.8911 2.2167 0.0277 
M8 5.5038 2.0729 0.0394 




The final equation of the ARMA model can be represented as follows: 
𝐴𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡̂ = 2.6928×𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 1.3799×𝐴𝑅(1) − 0.4840×𝐴𝑅(2) + 0.2060×𝑀𝐴(2)
+ 5.8911×𝑀5 + 5.5038×𝑀8 
The key underlying assumption of the ARMA models is that the residual must 
follow a white noise process with a mean of 0 and finite variance. Figure 4-2 shows the 
correlogram of the residuals; because the residuals of the model depict a white noise 
process, the model is reliable and can properly capture the variations of the conditional 
mean of the time series. Figure 4-3 shows the graph of the actual, fitted, and residuals of 
the ARMA model. 
Table 4-2 shows the results of the Ljung-Box Q test. Because the p-values for all 
lag levels are higher than the significance level of 5%, the null hypothesis that the data are 
independently distributed cannot be rejected. Thus, the residuals do not show any serial 
correlation and can be considered a white noise process. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Correlogram of the residuals of the ARMA(2,2) model 
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Table 4-2: Results of the Ljung-Box Q test for the residuals of the ARMA(2,2) model 
Lag Autocorrelation Q-Statistic P-Value 
1 –0.012 0.0330  
2 –0.021 0.1283  
3 0.071 1.2763  
4 –0.030 1.4812 0.224 
5 –0.106 4.0581 0.131 
6 0.100 6.3503 0.096 
7 0.026 6.5089 0.164 
8 –0.144 11.283 0.046 
9 0.031 11.510 0.074 
10 –0.058 12.308 0.091 
11 –0.002 12.309 0.138 
12 0.119 15.620 0.075 
13 0.034 15.900 0.103 
14 –0.036 16.208 0.134 
15 –0.030 16.428 0.172 
16 0.005 16.433 0.227 
17 0.024 16.575 0.280 
18 0.036 16.888 0.326 
19 0.053 17.562 0.350 
20 0.023 17.691 0.409 
 
 








































4.5.2. Heteroscedasticity Test 
After fitting the conditional mean function, the volatility of the asphalt cement price 
index should be checked for statistical significance. Although the residuals of the 
conditional mean function follow a white noise process, Engle (1982) found that the square 
of the residuals might not represent a white noise process, indicating the existence of 
heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity indicates that the variability of the residuals of some 
subpopulations differs from that of other subpopulations. In other words, the 
unpredictability of asphalt cement, which is the source of material price volatility risk, 
differs over time. Engle (1982) introduced the ARCH test, which regresses the squared 
residuals on lagged squared residuals and a constant to test if the heteroscedasticity effect 
is statistically significant. The results of the ARCH test indicate that the F-statistic is 
98.8731 with a p-value of 0.0000, meaning that the null hypothesis of the absence of the 
ARCH components can be rejected strongly. In other words, the volatility is statistically 
significant. 
4.5.3. Creating ARCH/GARCH Models 
Because the results of the heteroscedasticity test indicate that the volatility of the 
asphalt cement price index is statistically significant, ARCH/GARCH models can be 
created to measure, model, and forecast the uncertainty (i.e., unpredictability) of asphalt 
cement price. The most important part of the modeling process is determining the proper 
number of lags in equations 2 and 3 (i.e., L1 and L2). Different models with various 
combinations of L1 and L2 are considered in order to select the proper model. Best model 
selection is conducted based on the AIC (Akaike 1998) and the BIC (Schwarz 1978).  
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The results indicate that the GARCH(2,1) model produces the lowest AIC and BIC, 
equal to 8.1821 and 8.3334, respectively. Table 4-3 shows the estimated coefficients of the 
conditional volatility model. 
 
Table 4-3: Coefficients of the conditional volatility model for the asphalt cement price index 
Conditional Volatility Model (GARCH(2,1)) 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic P-Value 
ω 212.1689 9.7002 0.0000 
α1 0.776931 21.5847 0.0000 
α2 0.775087 22.5394 0.0000 
β1 –1.003282 –505.5455 0.0000 
Note: The variables that were not statistically significant in 5% significant level were excluded from the table 
 
After creation of the GARCH model, a heteroscedasticity test was conducted on the 
residuals of the GARCH model to check the effectiveness of the modeled volatility. The 
results of the ARCH test indicate that the F-statistic is 0.1695 with the p-value of 0.6810, 
meaning that the null hypothesis of the absence of the ARCH components cannot be 
rejected. In other words, the GARCH(2,1) model can successfully capture variations in 
volatility, and the volatility of the residuals of the GARCH model is not statistically 
significant.  
4.6. Measuring Conditional Volatility 
After selecting the best GARCH model using AIC and BIC criteria, estimating the 
coefficients of the model using MLE, analyzing the capability of the model to capture 
variations in volatility using an ARCH test, and analyzing the residuals of the model for 
white noise processes, the created model can be used to measure conditional volatility 




Figure 4-4: Calculated conditional volatility using GARCH(2,1) 
 
Figure 4-4 indicates that between January 2002 and September 2007, volatility in 
the asphalt cement price index was lower (i.e., the price index was more predictable) 
relative to the period before January 2002. However, volatility increased suddenly in July 
2008 and peaked in September 2008. This very large shock is followed by two other 
relatively large shocks in March 2010 and June 2011. Generally speaking, the volatility 
(i.e., unpredictability) of the asphalt cement price index was high between June 2008 and 
August 2012. However, volatility was much lower after August 2012 when compared with 













































































































4.7. Validating the Model 
As noted earlier, volatility is a latent variable and cannot be measured directly 
(Engle and Patton 2001). Therefore, model results cannot be compared with actual 
observed volatilities. Realized volatility is an alternative; it can provide a rough estimate 
of the actual volatilities (Andersen and Bollerslev 1998) and be used in place of actual 
volatility as a basis for evaluating the performance of the GARCH model (Danielsson 
2011). The estimated and forecast volatilities of the GARCH model and the realized 
volatilities then can be checked for general consonance. Consonance is tested by the 
Granger Causality test (Granger 2001). The most common method of calculating realized 
volatility is calculating the square of the changes (Karmakar 2005). Vilasuso (2002) used 
this method to estimate the realized volatilities of currency exchange rates and 
subsequently evaluated the performance of his GARCH model. Figure 4-5 compares the 
estimated conditional volatilities of the asphalt cement price index using the GARCH(2,1) 
model and the realized volatilities derived from the square of monthly changes. 
 
Figure 4-5: Comparison of estimated conditional volatilities and realized volatilities based on the 




























































































Conditional Volatility Realized Volatility
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Balaban (2004) suggested calculating the average monthly volatility for daily 
observations such as currency exchange rates (i.e., calculating the sum of the daily 
volatilities using the Vilasuso (2002) method and dividing by the number of trading days). 
Applying this approach, Joukar and Nahmens (2015) measured the average realized 
volatility of the monthly CCI for 6-month periods and used the results to evaluate their 
volatility forecasting model. In this study, the average realized volatilities for 2-month, 4-
month, and 6-month intervals are compared with the averages of the estimated and forecast 
volatilities over those time periods. Figure 4-6 to Figure 4-8 show the results. 
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The results of the Granger Causality test of the conditional volatilities and realized 
volatilities, calculated based on either the square of the monthly changes (Figure 4-5) or 
the average realized volatilities over two, four, or six months (Figure 4-6 to Figure 4-8), 
indicate that the estimated conditional and realized volatilities display statistically 
significant consonance. As an example, Table 4-4 shows the results of the Granger 
Causality test for the monthly conditional and monthly realized volatility; results indicate 
that the null hypothesis that time series data do not have information to explain each other 
are strongly rejected, even at the 1% significance level. 
4.8. Forecasting Conditional Volatility 
After creating the GARCH model, estimating its parameters, measuring the 
conditional volatility for the in-sample data points, and validating the results of the in-
sample model fitting, the model can be extrapolated to conduct out-of-sample forecasting. 
As noted earlier, the out-of-sample period is from January 2014 to December 2014.  
 
Table 4-4: Results of the Granger Causality test for conditional and realized volatility 
Dependent Variable: Conditional Volatility 
Explanatory Variable Chi-square Degree of Freedom P-Value 
Realized Volatility 210.5807 2 0.0000 
Dependent Variable: Realized Volatility 
Explanatory Variable Chi-square Degree of Freedom P-Value 
Conditional Volatility 13.3457 2 0.0013 
 
Figure 4-9 compares the forecast and estimated values of asphalt cement price 
volatility during the out-of-sample period. The forecast values are calculated by 
71 
 
extrapolating the developed model. The estimated values of asphalt cement price volatility 
are quantified using the GARCH model if the in-sample period is extended to cover the 
entire dataset (Ilbeigi et al. 2017). The results show that the MAPE is less than 2.7%, 




Figure 4-9: Forecast volatility of the asphalt cement price index using GARCH(2,1) 
 
The results correctly indicate that the forecast volatility values for the out-of-sample 
forecasting period are relatively low. Therefore, the unpredictability and level of 
uncertainty in the conditional mean model will be low in that period. 
4.9. Summary 
Asphalt cement is one of the most important materials in highway construction 



















































































contractors and can lead to price speculation and inflated bid prices. Many transportation 
agencies use different risk management strategies, such as offering PACs in contracts, 
utilizing owner buying power, or providing flexible project start times, to control the 
consequences of the uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement. However, before applying 
those strategies, transportation agencies need to measure, analyze, and forecast uncertainty 
in the price of asphalt cement to make decisions properly about implementing the 
strategies. In this chapter, the uncertainty in asphalt cement price was measured and 
forecast using ARCH/GARCH models. Results indicate that a GARCH(2,1) model with a 
conditional mean function of ARMA(2,2) can properly model the conditional volatilities 
in the price of asphalt cement. 
The outcomes of the GARCH model show that the uncertainty of the asphalt cement 
price index was considerable between March 1996 and January 2002 and between July 
2007 and August 2012. Between August 2012 and December 2013, uncertainty was 
comparatively low. Furthermore, the results of the out-of-sample forecasting process 
indicate that the developed model can predict the uncertainty in the price of asphalt cement 
with less than 3% error.  
This study’s primary contributions to the existing body of knowledge are 
measuring, modeling, and forecasting uncertainties in the price of asphalt cement over 
time. The results of this study can help transportation agencies systematically measure, 
analyze, and forecast the uncertainties in the price of asphalt cement and implement risk 
management strategies at the right time. Although this study was conducted using the state 
of Georgia’s asphalt cement price index, the proposed methodology can be used for similar 
datasets in other states and internationally. After quantifying the uncertainties in the price 
73 
 
of asphalt cement, development of quantitative models to determine the proper risk 
premiums and financial value of the risk management strategies could be a topic for future 





CHAPTER 5. EFFECTS OF PACS ON SUBMITTED BID PRICES 
5.1. Introduction 
The primary purpose of offering PACs in construction projects is to encourage 
contractors to exclude extra risk premiums from their cost estimations and submit lower 
bid prices. However, there is little knowledge about empirical assessment of PACs and 
their actual effects on bid prices. The third research objective of this dissertation is 
addressed in this chapter. To achieve the objective, the remainder of this chapter is 
structured as follows. After describing the research methodology and the steps taken in this 
empirical investigation, the characteristics of the dataset used in this research are defined. 
The multiple steps involved in modeling the variations in contractors’ submitted bid prices 
for major asphalt line items then are explained. Finally, the results of the statistical models 
are interpreted, and the findings of this research and indications for future work are 
summarized. The primary contributions of this chapter to the body of knowledge are (1) 
the creation of several multivariate regression models that have the power to explain the 
variations in highway contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items; and 
(2) the empirical assessment of whether offering PACs contributes to the variations in 
contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in highway projects. This 
work is expected to contribute to the construction engineering and management community 
by helping capital planners of transportation agencies systematically evaluate the effects 




5.2. Research Methodology 
Multivariate regression analysis was devised to identify significant variables that 
can explain variations in contractors’ submitted bids for major asphalt line items. Several 
steps were followed to create multivariate regression analysis models:  
1. Conduct a literature review and interview transportation cost professionals to 
identify a potential list of explanatory variables for modeling the variations in 
contractors’ submitted bid prices (e.g., project duration, number of bidders, 
quantity of asphalt line items, average price of asphalt cement, and availability of 
PACs in the contract) 
2. Develop a dataset of submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in 
transportation projects and gather information about the potential explanatory 
variables for these projects 
3. Categorize the projects into two groups of asphalt-intensive and non-asphalt-
intensive projects 
4. Identify unusual observations (i.e., outliers) in the dataset using a statistical test 
based on standardized residuals and remove these data points from the dataset 
5. Develop scatter plots of the contractors’ submitted bids against the potential 
explanatory variables and conduct the Pearson correlation test to determine whether 
any nonlinear relationships (e.g., quadratic, cubic, logarithmic, exponential, or 
power) exist between the submitted bid prices and any of the potential explanatory 
variables and, if needed, apply respective variable transformation 
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6. Apply a backward elimination algorithm to create the best subset multivariate 
regression model using information from potential explanatory variables to 
describe variations in the contractors’ submitted bids 
7. Evaluate the explanatory power of the multivariate regression model using 
ANOVA 
8. Diagnose multicollinearity in the developed multivariate regression model using 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) test to confirm that the model is reliable and the 
results are not misleading 
9. Analyze the residuals of the multivariate regression model to examine the 
appropriateness of the modeling assumptions 
10. Analyze the results and interpret the findings of the multivariate regression model 
Figure 5-1 shows the process of conducting the multivariate linear regression analysis to 
examine the effects of PACs on bid prices. 
 




Contractors’ submitted bid data were collected from 841 highway project contracts 
awarded in the state of Georgia from August 2009 to November 2012. These projects were 
distributed geographically across the seven districts throughout the state. The contract 
values of these projects range from $33,900 to $67,494,183 with an average value of 
$2,687,833 and a median of $871,909. The duration of these projects ranges from 102 to 
2049 days, with an average of 366 days and a median of 312 days. Unit-price bids ($/ton) 
submitted by contractors were collected for five major asphalt line items from these project 
contracts. These asphalt line items represent five major types of asphalt mixtures widely 
used in highway projects in the state. Table 5-1 describes these items and identifies the 
number of observations for each line item in our dataset. 
Highway projects differ with regard to the relative significance of asphalt line item 
costs in the total project cost. To address this major difference, the projects in the dataset 
were classified into two large groups: (1) asphalt-intensive projects, such as resurfacing, 
widening, and intersection improvement projects, in which there are several asphalt line 
items, and the costs of these items represent a considerably large portion of total project 
cost; and (2) non-asphalt-intensive projects, such as bridge replacement and drainage 











3130 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete 12.5mm, Superpave, GP2, Including Bitumen Materials 
3190 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete 19mm, GP1 or GP2 Including Bitumen Materials 
1812 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete Levelling Including Bitumen Materials 
1802 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete Patching Including Bitumen Materials 
4510 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete 12.5mm, Superpave, GP2, Including Polymer-Modified Bitumen Materials 
 
5.4. Modeling the Variations of Contractors’ Submitted Bid Prices for 
Major Asphalt Line Items 
A multivariate linear regression analysis was devised to create proper models for 
explaining variations in contractors’ submitted bid prices for main asphalt line items using 
the information available from the set of identified potential explanatory variables.  
5.4.1. Defining the Variables 
An extensive literature review and an interview with transportation cost 
professionals were conducted to identify a potential list of explanatory variables for 
modeling the variations in contractors’ submitted bid prices. The following factors were 
identified as potential explanatory variables. 
1- Duration of the project: The duration of a project may be an important effective 
factor in determining the bid price. Sonmez (2008), Lowe et al. (2006), and Trost 
and Oberlender (2003) considered project duration to model costs of construction 
projects. The unit of measure for project duration in this study is days. 
2- Quantity of the line item: The quantity of the line item may be an important factor 
in determining its price, possibly due to the existence of economy of scale. Carr 
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(1989) found that the cost of an activity is related to the quantity of the activity in 
construction projects. 
3- Total bid price: Total bid price shows the size of the project. Ahmad and Minkarah 
(1998) revealed that bid pricing decisions are affected by the project size.  
4- Relative value of the asphalt line item: This variable shows the relative dollar value 
of the line item compared to the total bid price of the project by calculating the ratio 
of the total price of the item over the total bid price. This variable is an indicator of 
the relative importance of the line item compared to the other line items in the 
project. Our interviews with transportation cost professionals indicated the 
importance of this factor in explaining variations in the bid prices submitted by 
contractors.     
5- Number of bidders: The number of bidders is an indicator of competition in the 
market. Carr (2005) presented a quantitative analysis of the impact of competition 
on project bid prices and concluded that bid prices submitted for a project increase 
as the level of competition in the market decreases. 
Asphalt cement is one of the most important input commodities in transportation 
projects. Wang and Liu (2012) statistically showed that there is a direct relationship 
between asphalt cement price and the submitted bid prices of asphalt mixtures. The 
following two explanatory variables are used to investigate the relationship between the 
price of asphalt cement and the submitted bid prices of the five major asphalt line items. 
6- Asphalt cement price index at the bid date: GDOT determines the asphalt cement 
price index based on the arithmetic average of asphalt cement prices from the 
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department’s monthly survey of approved asphalt cement suppliers. The maximum 
and minimum prices are excluded from the calculation of the index. 
7- Past trend of asphalt cement price index: The past trend of the asphalt cement 
price index might be an informative factor that affects contractors’ submitted bid 
prices for asphalt line items. This variable is determined for each month based on 
the slope of the trend line fitted to the last three months of price indexes.  
8- Location of the project: A distinction should be made between urban and rural 
locations considering that projects in urban areas may have access to more suppliers 
of liquid asphalt or may be closer to these suppliers compared to projects in rural 
locations. GDOT divides the state into seven districts: District One – Gainesville, 
District Two – Tennille, District Three – Thomaston, District Four – Tifton, District 
Five – Jesup, District Six – Cartersville, and District Seven – Chamblee. All 
projects in District Seven (Metro Atlanta) are urban projects, whereas most projects 
in the other districts, especially Districts Two, Three, and Four, are rural projects. 
Considering the availability of resources, distance from suppliers of liquid asphalt, 
and weather conditions, the location of a project may affect submitted bid prices. 
Ahmad and Minkarah (1988) surveyed 400 general contractors and found that 
project location is one of the most important criteria that affect bid prices. We have 
used several binary indicators to address this issue. The value of the binary indicator 
of each region is 1 if the project is located in the region. These binary variables 
representing project geographical location have been used as control variables in 




9- Eligibility of the projects for PAC: One of the major goals of this research is to 
examine the effect of offering PAC on submitted bid prices for main asphalt line 
items. If a project is eligible for PAC the value of this binary variable becomes 1 
and otherwise, it becomes 0. 
Information about existing and upcoming projects in the market might affect 
contractors’ bidding behaviors; Akintoye (2000) identified market conditions as one of the 
main factors influencing bid prices. GDOT announces its upcoming new projects for each 
fiscal year (from July 1 to the following June 30) in advance. Thus, the number of existing 
and upcoming projects, estimated dollar values of these projects, and total quantity of main 
asphalt line items in these projects might affect contractors’ bid price decisions for a 
specific project. We consider the following three variables to capture information about 
existing and upcoming projects in the region where the project was let.  
10- Annual number of projects in the region: This variable is the total number of 
existing and upcoming projects in the project’s region in the fiscal year that the 
project was let. 
11- Annual value of the projects in the region: This variable is the total annual dollar 
value of all existing and upcoming projects in the project’s region in the fiscal year 
that the project was let.  
12- Annual quantity of asphalt mixtures in the region: This variable is the total 
quantity of existing and upcoming asphalt mixtures in the project’s region in the 
fiscal year that the project was let. 
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In addition, we consider similar variables to capture market conditions in GDOT 
districts other than the region in which the project was let. These variables represent market 
conditions in the neighboring regions that might affect bidders’ pricing decisions.  
13- Annual number of projects in other regions: This variable is the total number of 
existing and upcoming projects in the other regions in the fiscal year that the project 
was let.  
14-  Annual value of the projects in other regions: This variable is the total annual 
dollar value of all existing and upcoming projects in the other regions in the fiscal 
year that the project was let.  
15- Annual quantity of asphalt mixture in other regions: This variable is the total 
quantity of existing and upcoming asphalt mixtures in the other regions in the fiscal 
year that the project was let.  
5.4.2. Detecting Unusual Observations 
Outliers should be identified and removed from the dataset because unusual 
observations are distant from other observations and therefore make the results of 
regression analysis unreliable. A statistical test based on standardized residuals and 
leverage values (Neter et al. 1996) was used to detect unusual observations. A data point 
was considered unusual if the absolute value of the standardized residual is greater than 2 
or if the leverage value is more than 3 times the number of model coefficients divided by 
the number of observations. Table 5-2 shows the number of unusual observations removed 
from the dataset for each asphalt line item. Only a small fraction of data points was 
identified as outliers for these asphalt line items; most unusual observations were from 
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projects with very small quantities of asphalt mixtures. The remaining data points were 
large enough to conduct meaningful statistical analysis. 
 
Table 5-2: Number of unusual observations in the dataset for each major asphalt line item 
Line Item 
ID 
Number of Observations 












3130 216 45 8 0 
3190 98 82 4 0 
1812 611 92 13 2 
1802 326 134 9 3 
4510 79 18 3 0 
 
5.4.3. Scatter Plots and Variable Transformation 
Scatter plots of the identified potential explanatory variables and contractors’ 
submitted bid prices were developed to determine whether any nonlinear relationships 
(e.g., quadratic, cubic, logarithmic, exponential, or power) exist between submitted bid 
prices and any of the potential explanatory variables. The results indicate that using the 
natural logarithm of quantity and total bid price, instead of these variables in their original 
forms, leads to more appropriate regression models. Furthermore, Pearson correlation 
coefficients between submitted bid prices and the potential explanatory variables were 
calculated. The results indicate that the linear correlations between natural logarithm 
transformed forms of quantity and total bid price and submitted bid prices are higher than 
those between the original forms of quantity and total bid price and submitted bid prices. 
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5.4.4. Best Subset Regression Models  
A best subset regression model was created to explain the variations in submitted 
bid prices for each main asphalt line item using the information available in the potential 
explanatory variables. A backward elimination algorithm (Webster 2013) was applied to 
determine the combination (i.e., subset) of potential explanatory variables that can best 
model the variations in submitted bids for main asphalt line items in each group of projects. 
Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 show the coefficients and t-statistics of the best subset regression 
models created for explaining the variations in the five main asphalt line items for asphalt-
intensive and non-asphalt-intensive projects, respectively. A regression model for item 
4510 for non-asphalt-intensive projects was not possible due to lack of observations. 
All specified coefficients are significant at the 5% level; therefore, the contribution 
of the variables with non-zero coefficients statistically significantly explains the variations 
in the submitted bid prices for each asphalt line item. The adjusted R-squared values 
indicate that all regression models can be considered good fits for observed submitted bid 





Table 5-3: Coefficients and t-statistics of the regression models for major asphalt line items of the asphalt-
intensive projects 





































































Location of the Project: Region 1 
–4.547 
(–2.97) 
N/A N/A N/A 
–6.052 
(–2.77) 





































Location of the Project: Region 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Number of Projects in the Region N/A N/A NA N/A N/A 
Annual Value of Projects in the Region N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 













Annual Value of Projects in Other Regions N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Quantity of Asphalt Mixture in Other Regions N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
R-Sq (adj) 60.1% 66.2% 57.7% 57.8% 64.2% 
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses 
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Table 5-4: Coefficients and t-statistics of the regression models for major asphalt line items of the non-asphalt-
intensive projects 











































































Number of Bidders 
–1.002 
(–2.22) 
N/A N/A N/A 




Duration of the Project N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Past Trend of the AC Index N/A N/A N/A 
0.935 
(2.86) 
PAC Eligibility of the Project N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 


























Location of the Project: Region 6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Number of Projects in the Region N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Value of Projects in the Region N/A N/A N/A 
1.4×10–7 
(3.01) 
Annual Quantity of Asphalt Mixture in the Region N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Number of Projects in Other Regions 
–0.036 
(–2.61) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Value of Projects in Other Regions N/A N/A N/A 
2.1×10–7 
(4.06) 
Annual Quantity of Asphalt Mixture in Other Regions N/A N/A N/A 
–1.63×10–5 
(–2.24) 
R-Sq (adj) 70.7% 73.2% 63.9% 69.0% 
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses 
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5.4.5. ANOVA Tests 
ANOVA (Webster 2013) is a statistical test that was used to diagnose the goodness 
of the developed regression models for the five asphalt line items. ANOVA was used to 
examine the statistical explanatory power of the developed regression models for asphalt 
line items. The results of the ANOVA tests indicate that the null hypotheses are strongly 
rejected at the 1% significance level for all models. In other words, we cannot reject the 
statement that the developed regression models for explaining the variations in the 
submitted bid prices are statistically reliable; therefore, the models have statistically 
significant explanatory power to describe the variations in the submitted bid prices for 
major asphalt line items. Table 5-5 shows an example of the results of the ANOVA 
performed on the regression model created for asphalt line item 3130 in asphalt-intensive 
projects. Because the p-value is much smaller than the significance level (i.e., it was 
considered 1% in this study), the null hypothesis is rejected, thus indicating that the model 
has significant explanatory power. 
 









Regression 9 11238.8 1248.8 35.67 0.000 
Residual Error 198 6931.1 35.0   
Total 207 18170.0    
 
5.4.6. Multicollinearity Diagnosis   
The VIF (Webster 2013) was calculated for the developed regression models to 
diagnose any multicollinearity issues (i.e., if two or more explanatory variables in a 
multivariate regression model are highly correlated, the results might be misleading). Table 
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5-6 and Table 5-7 show the calculated VIFs for explanatory variables in the regression 
models of asphalt-intensive and non-asphalt-intensive projects, respectively. All calculated 
VIFs are less than 10, which is the recommended threshold for detecting multicollinearity 
in regression models (Webster 2013); therefore, multicollinearity does not exist in any of 
the five regression models.  
5.4.7. Residual analysis 
Q-Q plots, histogram of residuals, and scatter plots of residuals against fitted values 
and observation orders were built for the developed regression models to examine whether 
the model residuals follow any particular pattern. For example, Figure 5-2 depicts the 
residual plots of the regression model for item 1812 in asphalt-intensive projects. This 
figure indicates no violation of the basic assumptions of a regression model. The Q-Q plot 
of the residuals against normal distribution is close to a straight line, the histogram of the 
residuals is similar to a normal distribution, and no considerable pattern or trend is observed 
in the scatter plots of residuals against fitted values and observation orders. The results of 
the residual analysis for four other regression models are similar. 
 
 




Table 5-6: Variance inflation factor for the explanatory variables in the regression models of asphalt-intensive projects 
Variables 3130 3121 1812 1802 4510 
Ln Quantity for the Item 1.152 8.79 6.384 2.577 1.285 
Ln Total Bid Price N/A 7.12 6.870 N/A 1.206 
AC Index at the Bid Date 1.273 1.102 2.820 1.361 1.091 
Number of Bidders 1.513 N/A 1.300 N/A N/A 
Relative Value of the Line Item N/A 4.280 3.884 1.754 N/A 
Duration of the Project N/A N/A 3.625 N/A N/A 
Past Trend of the AC Index N/A N/A 1.328 N/A N/A 
PAC Eligibility of the Project N/A N/A 2.914 N/A N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 1 1.314 N/A N/A N/A 1.178 
Location of the Project: Region 2 N/A N/A N/A 1.201 N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 3 1.545 N/A 1.694 N/A 1.163 
Location of the Project: Region 4 1.417 1.034 1.557 1.824 N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 5 1.197 1.052 1.213 1.428 N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 6 N/A N/A N/A 1.440 N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Number of Projects in the Region N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Value of Projects in the Region N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Quantity of Asphalt Mixture in the Region 1.553 N/A 1.951 1.723 N/A 
Annual Number of Projects in Other Regions N/A N/A 3.064 N/A N/A 
Annual Value of Projects in Other Regions N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 






Table 5-7: Variance inflation factor for the explanatory variables in the regression models of non-asphalt-intensive projects 
Variables 3130 3121 1812 1802 4510 









































Ln Total Bid Price 1.728 3.801 1.241 1.096 
AC Index at the Bid Date N/A 1.009 1.036 3.575 
Number of Bidders 1.328 N/A N/A N/A 
Relative Value of the Line Item N/A 3.280 N/A N/A 
Duration of the Project N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Past Trend of the AC Index N/A N/A N/A 2.761 
PAC Eligibility of the Project N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 2 N/A N/A 1.120 N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 3 1.363 N/A N/A 1.440 
Location of the Project: Region 4 1.614 1.035 1.215 N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 5 1.163 1.086 1.093 N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Location of the Project: Region 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Number of Projects in the Region N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Value of Projects in the Region N/A N/A N/A 2.567 
Annual Quantity of Asphalt Mixture in the Region N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Number of Projects in Other Regions 1.346 N/A N/A N/A 
Annual Value of Projects in Other Regions N/A N/A N/A 4.748 






5.5. Interpretation of the Results 
In the previous sections, regression analysis was conducted to model the variations 
in the submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items of asphalt-intensive and non-
asphalt-intensive projects.  
5.5.1. Asphalt-Intensive Projects 
The results of the five regression models created for asphalt-intensive projects 
indicate that the quantity of the asphalt line item is a statistically significant explanatory 
variable with a negative sign in all five models for asphalt-intensive projects. The negative 
sign indicates that the larger the quantity of the asphalt in the project, the lower the 
contractor’s unit price for the asphalt line item (i.e., the existence of economy of scale). 
The quantity variable has the highest absolute t-statistics value among all potential 
explanatory variables in all models and has the highest power to explain the variations in 
the submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items. 
Asphalt cement price index at the bid date is a statistically significant explanatory 
variable in all five models of asphalt-intensive projects with a positive coefficient, 
indicating that the expected bid prices increase as the asphalt cement price index increases. 
The explanatory variable of total bid price is statistically significant in three out of 
five models developed for asphalt-intensive projects with a positive coefficient, indicating 
that the expected bid prices for major asphalt line items are relatively greater for larger 
projects than for smaller projects. 
Similar to the total bid price, the relative value of the asphalt line item is statistically 
significant with a positive coefficient in three out of five models for asphalt-intensive 
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projects, indicating that the expected bid price for those major asphalt line items increases 
as the relative value of the line item increases. The number of bidders is a statistically 
significant explanatory variable with a negative coefficient in two models for asphalt-
intensive projects, which indicates that expected bid prices decrease as the number of 
bidders increases.  
Project duration is not a statistically significant explanatory variable for all models 
created for asphalt-intensive projects except for the model of line item 1812. Even for this 
model, the t-statistic for project duration is relatively low; therefore, project duration does 
not have considerably high explanatory power to describe the variation in submitted bid 
prices for major asphalt line items in asphalt-intensive projects.  
Although the asphalt cement price index is a significant explanatory variable in all 
models created for asphalt-intensive projects, the explanatory variable of the past trend of 
the asphalt cement price index is only significant in the model developed for line item 
1812. Thus, the past trend of the asphalt cement price is not a significant variable to 
describe the variations in the submitted bid prices for most asphalt line items. It can be 
concluded that from contractors’ point of view, the past trend of the asphalt cement price 
index is not an appropriate factor to use to determine their bid prices. This might be due to 
the significant volatility in the asphalt cement price index, indicating that future prices do 
not follow past trends in many cases. Thus, contractors do not consider the past trends in 
their bids. 
Variables representing the location of the project do not show any similar effects in 
explaining the variations in submitted bid prices for different asphalt line items. The 
variables representing regions 4 and 5 are statistically significant in four out of the five 
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models created for asphalt-intensive projects with positive coefficients (i.e., expected bid 
prices for projects in regions 4 and 5 are relatively higher than those in the other regions). 
None of the location variables has a considerably large t-statistic. Overall, location is not a 
powerful explanatory variable to describe the variations in submitted bid prices for major 
asphalt line items in asphalt-intensive projects. Similarly, the three variables representing 
the market conditions in the region where the project was let and the three variables 
representing market conditions in the neighboring regions do not have considerable 
explanatory power to explain variations in submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items.  
The annual number and value of projects in the region where the project was let, 
the annual value of the projects in other regions, and the annual quantity of asphalt mixture 
in other regions are not statistically significant in any models developed for asphalt-
intensive projects. The annual number of projects in other regions and the annual quantity 
of asphalt mixture in the region are statistically significant in only one and three of the 
models for asphalt-intensive projects, respectively. The t-statistics of those variables in 
those models are not considerably large. Thus, variables related to existing and upcoming 
projects in the market do not have considerable explanatory power to explain the variations 
in submitted bid prices for asphalt line items in asphalt-intensive projects. 
Finally, PAC eligibility is not a statistically significant explanatory variable in all 
models created for asphalt-intensive projects, except the model for line item 1812. Even in 
this model, the project’s PAC eligibility is statistically significant with a positive sign (i.e., 
the expected bid prices for asphalt line item 1812 is greater in PAC-eligible projects than 
in PAC-ineligible projects). This line item is related to leveling and requires more liquid 
asphalt cement (approximately 6.5-7% of hot mix asphalt volume) compared to the other 
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line items. The t-statistic of the PAC variable in this model is not substantially large. Thus, 
the project’s eligibility for the PAC program does not have much power to explain the 
variations in the submitted bid prices for this line item. Overall, no evidence was found to 
support the hypothesis that offering PAC would reduce the submitted bid prices of major 
asphalt line items in asphalt-intensive projects.  
5.5.2. Non-Asphalt-Intensive Projects 
The results of the regression analysis for non-asphalt-intensive projects indicate 
that the quantity of the asphalt line item is a statistically significant explanatory variable 
with a negative coefficient in all four models, indicating that the submitted bid prices for 
major asphalt line items in non-asphalt-intensive projects are expected to decrease as the 
quantity of the line items increases. 
The explanatory variable of total bid price is statistically significant in all four 
models created for non-asphalt-intensive projects with a positive coefficient, indicating 
that the expected bid prices for major asphalt line items in non-asphalt-intensive projects 
are relatively greater for large projects than for small projects. 
Asphalt cement price index is a statistically significant explanatory variable with a 
positive sign in three out of four models, indicating that the expected value of bid prices 
for major asphalt line items in non-asphalt-intensive projects increases as the asphalt 
cement price index increases.  
Number of bidders, relative value of the line item, and past trend of the asphalt 
cement index are statistically significant in only one out of the four models, with a not 
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considerably large t-statistic. Thus, these variables are not among the powerful explanatory 
variables to explain the variations in submitted bid prices. 
Project duration and the three binary variables representing the location of the 
project in regions 1, 6, and 7 are not statistically significant in any models. The variables 
representing regions 4 and 5 are statistically significant in three out of the four models 
created for non-asphalt-intensive projects with positive coefficients (i.e., expected bid 
prices for projects in regions 4 and 5 are relatively higher than those in the other regions). 
None of the location variables has a considerably large t-statistic. Overall, location is not a 
powerful explanatory variable to describe the variations in submitted bid prices for major 
asphalt line items in non-asphalt-intensive projects. 
The annual number of projects and quantity of asphalt mixture in the region where 
the project was let are not statistically significant in any models. The other four explanatory 
variables related to market conditions (i.e., annual value of the projects in the region, 
annual number of projects, value of the projects, and quantity of asphalt mixture in other 
regions) are statistically significant in only one model with no considerably large t-
statistics. Overall, the variables representing market conditions do not have considerable 
explanatory power to explain the variations in the submitted bid prices for major asphalt 
line items. The explanatory variable of the project’s PAC eligibility is not a statistically 
significant variable in any models created for non-asphalt-intensive projects. 
5.6. Summary 
It is concluded that the variations in the submitted bid prices for major asphalt line 
items in transportation projects can be explained by a linear combination of several 
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variables, such as the quantity of the asphalt line items in the project, total bid price, and 
the asphalt cement price index. The most powerful explanatory variables for explaining the 
variations in the submitted bid prices are the quantity of the line item, the total bid price of 
the projects, and the asphalt cement price index at the bid date. 
Variables, such as the duration of the project, the past trend of the asphalt cement 
price index, the location of the project, and the variables related to market conditions in the 
region in which the project was let or in neighboring regions are typically not statistically 
significant and do not have considerable explanatory power in most cases to explain the 
variations in the submitted bid prices.  
Eligibility for the PAC is statistically nonsignificant in all models except the one 
developed for line item 1812 (Recycled Asphaltic Concrete Leveling) in asphalt-intensive 
projects. This variable has a positive coefficient, indicating that expected bid prices for this 
line item in PAC-eligible projects are higher than those in PAC-ineligible projects. Thus, 
no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that offering PAC would reduce the 
submitted bid prices of major asphalt line items in both asphalt-intensive and non-asphalt-
intensive projects. 
Timing of asphalt work may affect contractors’ submitted bid prices. Contractors 
may submit relatively higher bids for new construction projects with asphalt work 
scheduled in the distant future than for overlay projects with asphalt work scheduled close 
to the contract award date. However, this likelihood could not be examined in this study 
due to the limitations of our dataset. No further timing information is available other than 
the total project duration that has been used in this study. In a future study, detailed 
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information about project schedule, especially information about the exact timing of 
asphalt work, should be used to enhance the quality of the developed regression models. 
Unbalanced bids can be a major issue in the assessment of submitted bid prices for 
construction projects (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2009). For the last two decades, GDOT has 
adopted a rigorous process for analyzing bid reasonableness in order to detect and reject 
unbalanced bids. In essence, every bid is evaluated against the engineer’s estimate, and 
GDOT rejects those nonresponsive bids that significantly differ from the engineer’s 
estimate. This comparative assessment is done for all major line items, including asphalt 
line items, both in terms of quantities and unit prices. Therefore, the dataset used in this 
study does not include rejected bids, and unbalancing has not been an issue in this analysis. 
Although this study was conducted using data from transportation projects in the 
state of Georgia, the proposed framework for conducting rigorous empirical studies can be 
used for similar datasets in other states and internationally. A more elaborate study with a 
larger dataset from several state DOTs and more potential explanatory variables can be the 
next step to compare the results across different owner organizations.    
The primary contributions of this research to the body of knowledge are (1) the 
creation of several multivariate regression models that have the power to explain the 
variations in highway contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items; and 
(2) the empirical assessment of whether offering PACs contributes to the variations in 
contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in highway projects. This 
work is expected to contribute to the construction engineering and management community 
by helping capital planners of transportation agencies and owners of major capital projects 
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CHAPTER 6. EFFECTS OF PACS ON COMPETITION AMONG 
BIDDERS 
6.1. Introduction 
In addition to receiving lower bid prices, transportation agencies may benefit from 
PACs through higher competition among bidders. Theoretically, offering PACs in 
contracts can stabilize the construction market and support all contractors regardless of 
their size and access to the sources of critical materials such as asphalt cement. Therefore, 
offering PACs in construction contracts can potentially encourage greater competition and 
result in more bidders and less dispersion in the bid prices received for a project (Ilbeigi 
and Castro-Lacouture 2017). However, there is little knowledge about the actual effects of 
PACs on the number of bidders for a project and the dispersion of submitted bid prices. 
This chapter addresses the fourth research objective of this dissertation: an empirical 
assessment of the effects of offering PACs on competition among bidders in transportation 
projects. 
The level of competition can be quantified based on the number of bidders (Skolnik 
2011) and the dispersion of the submitted bid prices (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000). The 
average number of bidders per project for each month, the number of unique contractors 
bidding each month divided by the number of projects delivered in that month, and the 
dispersion of submitted bid prices for each month are analyzed over time to determine 
whether these values statistically changed after PACs were offered. To conduct the 
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empirical analysis and achieve the research objective, the reminder of this chapter is 
structured as follows. The proposed research methodology and steps taken in this study are 
described in the next section. The datasets used in this empirical study then are introduced. 
The average number of bidders per project and the number of unique bidders divided by 
the total number of projects for each month are analyzed over time using CUSUM control 
charts to check whether their processes statistically changed after the introduction of PACs. 
Dispersion of the submitted bid prices for projects is analyzed using standard deviation 
control charts with variable sample size. Finally, the conclusions and suggestions for future 
work are presented. The primary contribution of this research to the body of knowledge is 
the empirical assessment of whether offering PACs contributes to the number of bidders 
and/or dispersion of the received bid prices in highway projects. This study can help capital 
planners and transportation agencies systematically evaluate the effects of their risk 
management strategies, such as PACs, on received bid prices. 
6.2. Research Methodology 
One approach for statistically analyzing the effects that offering PACs has on the 
number of bidders or dispersion of submitted bid prices is to model the relationships 
between these dependent variables (i.e., the number of bidders and dispersion of bid prices) 
and various potential explanatory variables and see whether availability of PACs is a 
statistically significant explanatory variable in those models. However, properly 
identifying and quantifying all potential factors to accurately investigate their effects on 
the variations in the number of bidders and the dispersion of submitted bid prices may not 
be efficiently feasible in many cases due to lack of information and data. Alternatively, the 
historical records of the average number of bidders and dispersion of submitted bid prices 
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can be monitored over time using system monitoring processes to check whether their 
variations have statistically changed after the introduction of the PAC program. The latter 
approach does not require a large amount of input data and produces reliable, unbiased, 
and robust results (Montgomery 2007). 
The CUSUM system monitoring method combined with time series analysis is used 
to check whether the average number of bidders per job and the number of unique 
contractors divided by the number of projects for each month have statistically changed 
after the introduction of the PAC program. A standard deviation control chart with variable 
sample size then is used to check whether the dispersion of the bid prices changed after 
PACs were offered. Several steps are followed to conduct the CUSUM analysis: 
1- The time series of the average number of bidders per project and the number of 
unique bidders divided by the total number of projects for each month are created. 
2- Autocorrelation in time series is checked. 
3- If the time series are autocorrelated, a proper time series model is created and fitted 
to the data, and the CUSUM analysis is conducted on the residuals of the time series 
model instead of the original data. 
4- CUSUM control charts are created, and their lower and upper control limits are 
estimated using the historical data before the introduction of the PAC program. 
5- Historical data after offering of PACs are checked for inclusion within the control 
limits. 
Figure 6-1 shows the process used to analyze the effects of PACs on the number of bidders 
using the CUSUM system monitoring process. 
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To create the standard deviation control chart and analyze the dispersion of the submitted 
bid prices, the following steps are taken: 
1- Datasets of contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in 
transportation projects are gathered. 
2- Outliers of the submitted bid prices are detected using the modified Thompson Tau 
method and are removed from the datasets. 
3- Expected bid prices for each line item in each project are estimated using 
multivariate linear regression models. 
4- Residuals of the regression models that represent the difference between the 
submitted bid prices and the expected bid prices are calculated. 
 
 





5- Standard deviation control charts with variable sample size are created for each 
major asphalt line item using the difference between submitted bid prices and 
expected bid prices before the start date of the PAC program. 
6- Standard deviations of the submitted bid prices after offering of PACs are 
monitored using the developed control charts to check whether the dispersion of 
the bid prices has statistically changed.   
Figure 6-2 shows the steps of conducting a standard deviation system monitoring 
process to investigate the effects of PACs on the dispersion of submitted bid prices. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Process to conduct a standard deviation system monitoring process to examine effects of 





Bid data were collected from 1,602 highway projects awarded in the state of 
Georgia from September 2000 to September 2007. These projects were distributed 
geographically across the seven districts in the state. Contract values of these projects range 
from $57,650 to $218,024,661 with an average contract value of $5,282,814 and a median 
of $1,392,159. Durations of these projects range from 67 to 2,043 days, with an average 
duration of 448 days and a median of 379 days.  
6.4. Analysis of Effects of PACs on Number of Bidders 
Figure 6-3 shows the average number of bidders per highway construction project 
in the state of Georgia from September 2000 to September 2007. 
 
 






































GDOT has been offered PAC for asphalt line items in highway construction 
projects since September 2005. The recorded average number of bidders per project from 
September 2000 to August 2005 are used to create the CUSUM system monitoring control 
chart and estimate its upper and lower control limits. The control chart created is used to 
check whether the observations after offering of PAC in September 2005 are still within 
the control limits or whether their behavior has statistically changed. 
CUSUM control charts are designed to analyze variables that are not autocorrelated 
and follow a white noise process (Montgomery 2007). If the historical records of a variable 
are autocorrelated, a proper time series model should be fitted to the data and the CUSUM 
analysis should be conducted on the residuals of the time series model (Lu and Reynolds 
2001). 
The results of the Ljung-Box Q test (Ljung and Box 1978) on the average number 
of bidders per project specify that the time series of this variable is autocorrelated. 
Therefore, first, the time series analysis should be conducted. In the time series analysis, 
the main properties of the historical data are identified and characterized to build the time 
series model that can properly explain the variations of the data over time. AR models are 
among the time series models used most often. An AR(p) model represents the AR model 
of order p, which defines the current value of a process based on its p past values using the 
following equation (Diebold 1998): 







𝜑𝑖 is the parameter of the model 
c is a constant 
𝑡 is the error term 
The AR models are designed for stationary time series (i.e., historical data that 
show a trend and have a mean and variance that are constant over time). Therefore, if the 
historical data are not stationary, a trend variable might be required in the model. The 
results of the time series analysis indicate that an autoregressive model of order one (i.e., 
AR(1)) with a trend variable is properly fitted to the historical data. Table 6-1 shows the 
results of the Ljung-Box Q test on the residuals of the time series model. Because the 
calculated p-values of the Q-statistics for all lags are greater than the significance level 
(i.e., 5%), the null hypothesis that the data are independently distributed cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, the residuals do not show any serial correlation, and the time series model is 
acceptable (Diebold 1998).  
CUSUM control charts monitor a process by accumulating derivations from the 
mean of the process using the following statistics (Montgomery 2007): 
𝐶𝑖
+ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[0, 𝑥𝑖 − (𝜇0 + 𝐾) + 𝐶𝑖−1
+ ] 
𝐶𝑖




+ is the cumulative derivation of point i above the target value 
 𝐶𝑖
− is the cumulative derivation of point i below the target value 
𝜇0 is the mean of the process 
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K is the reference value that is typically defined as being halfway between the target mean 
(i.e., 𝜇0) and the out-of-control value of the mean that should be detected 
If either 𝐶𝑖
+ or 𝐶𝑖
− exceeds the decision interval H, the process has statistically changed. A 
reasonable value for H is five times the process standard deviation (Montgomery 2007). 
 
Table 6-1: Results of the Ljung-Box Q test on the residuals of the time series model 
Lag Autocorrelation Q-Statistic P-Value 
1 –0.070 0.4231  
2 0.152 2.4466 0.118 
3 –0.093 3.2209 0.200 
4 0.091 3.9660 0.265 
5 0.092 4.7373 0.315 
6 0.090 5.4802 0.360 
7 –0.020 5.5163 0.479 
8 0.071 5.9913 0.541 
9 –0.106 7.0761 0.528 
10 0.084 7.7617 0.558 
11 0.032 7.8602 0.642 
12 0.118 9.2549 0.598 
13 –0.097 10.222 0.597 
14 –0.078 10.844 0.624 
15 –0.007 10.848 0.698 
16 –0.073 11.422 0.722 
17 0.056 11.765 0.760 
18 –0.071 12.320 0.780 
19 –0.073 12.917 0.796 
20 0.044 13.134 0.832 
 
Figure 6-4 shows the CUSUM control chart for the average number of bidders per 
project. The lower and upper control limits are estimated as –2.408 and 2.408, respectively. 
Although the C+ in February 2007 is very close to the upper limit, it does not pass the 
control limit and decreases immediately in the following month, indicating that it was not 
a statistically significant and long-lasting change in the behavior of the variable. Therefore, 
the control chart indicates that the process has not changed statistically after the 
introduction of the PAC program in Georgia in September 2005.  
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Other than the overall number of bidders per project, a PAC program may lead to 
a fairer market that attracts more companies to be active. Therefore, the number of unique 
contractors that participate in bids in a month divided by the total number of projects 
(Figure 6-5) is another indicator that is investigated as a proxy for competition.  
 
 
Figure 6-4: CUSUM control chart for the average number of bidders per project 
 
The results of the Ljung-Box Q test for the historical records of this variable 
indicate that the p-values of the Q-statistics for all lags are greater than 5%. Thus, the time 
series is not autocorrelated, and the CUSUM control chart can be created using the original 
data. Figure 6-6 shows the control chart for the number of unique contractors bidding in 
Georgia divided by the total number of projects for each month. Similar to the previous 







































Upper Control Limit = 2.408
Lower Control Limit = -2.408





limits are estimated using the historical records before the introduction of the PAC program 
(i.e., from September 2000 to August 2005).  
 
Figure 6-5: Number of unique bidders divided by total number of projects for each month 
 
Figure 6-6: CUSUM control chart for the number of unique contractors bidding in Georgia divided 



























































































Lower Control Limit = -3.316
Upper Control Limit = 3.316
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The lower and upper control limits are estimated as –3.316 and 3.316, respectively. 
The control chart shows that the number of unique bidders divided by the number of 
projects stays within the control limits after September 2005, and the behavior of this 
variable has not statistically changed after introduction of the PAC. 
In summary, the results of the system monitoring process using the CUSUM control 
charts for both variables, the average number of bidders per project for each month and the 
number of unique bidders divided by the total number of projects in each month, show that 
there is no evidence to indicate that offering PAC has statistically affected these two 
variables. 
6.5. Analysis of PAC Effects on Dispersion of Submitted Bid Prices 
In a stable and reasonable market in which many contractors can properly compete, 
prices converge and owner organizations face less-dispersed bid prices (Dufwenberg and 
Gneezy 2000). Theoretically, offering PACs in contracts can stabilize the market by 
managing the risk of material price volatility and supporting all contractors regardless of 
their size and access to critical resources (Skolnik 2011). In this section, submitted bid 
prices for four major asphalt line items in highway projects in Georgia from September 
2000 to September 2007 are analyzed to check whether the offering of PACs has affected 
the dispersion of bid prices. These asphalt line items represent four major types of asphalt 
mixtures widely used in highway projects in the state. Table 6-2 describes these line items 









3121 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete 25mm Superpave, GP1 or GP2 
3130 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete 12.5mm, Superpave, GP2, Including Bitumen Materials 
3190 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete 19mm, GP1 or GP2 Including Bitumen Materials 
1812 Recycled Asphaltic Concrete Levelling Including Bitumen Materials 
 
The modified Thompson Tau test is used to detect the outliers in the submitted bid 
prices. Table 6-3 shows the number of observations and the number of outliers removed 
from the dataset for each asphalt line item. Only a small fraction of data points was 
identified as outliers for these asphalt line items. Most outliers were from projects with 
very small quantities of asphalt mixtures. The remaining data points are large enough to 
conduct meaningful statistical analysis. 
 
Table 6-3: Number of observations and outliers in the dataset for each major asphalt line item 
Line Item 
ID 
Number of Observations 
Number of Unusual 
Observations 
3121 4633 77 
3130 4463 136 
3190 5545 123 
1812 13501 155 
 
First, the standard deviation system monitoring process for one of the line items 
(i.e., 3190) is described in detail to explain the steps and the methodology. Then the 
presented methodology is repeated on the other three line items. Figure 6-7 shows the 
scatter plot of the submitted bid prices for line item 3190 from September 2000 to 
September 2007 after removal of the detected outliers.  
Because factors such as project size, location, contract duration, bid dates, and 
number of bidders may affect the bid prices (Ilbeigi et al. 2015a), the scales of the submitted 
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bid prices for different projects might be different. Therefore, before analyzing the 
historical records of the bid prices using standard deviation control charts, the effects of 
other potential factors should be identified and captured. In chapter 5, multivariate linear 
regression models were created to explain the variations in the submitted bid prices for the 
major asphalt line items in highway construction projects. Potential explanatory variables 
such as quantity of the asphalt line item, asphalt cement price at bid date, project duration, 




Figure 6-7: Submitted bid prices for line item 3190 
Using the regression models developed in the previous chapter, the expected value 
for the submitted bid prices for each line item in each project is estimated. Then the error 

































prices) for each observation is calculated. The error terms represent the variation of the 
actual submitted bid prices from the estimated expected bid prices. In chapter 5, the error 
terms (i.e., the residuals of their models) were shown to follow a normal distribution, 
indicating that the identified explanatory variables can properly explain the variations of 
the submitted bid prices.  
 
 
Figure 6-8: Deviations of the actual submitted bid prices from the expected bid prices for line item 
3190 
 
Basically, the error terms represent the bid prices after capturing and removing the 
effects of the most important effective factors. Therefore, the error terms are examined to 
check whether the dispersion of the deviations of the submitted bid prices from the 



































6-8 shows the deviation of the actual submitted bid prices from the expected bid prices 
(i.e., the residuals of the regression model) for line item 3190. 
After cleaning and preparing the dataset, the dispersion of the deviations of the 
submitted bid prices from the expected bid prices is analyzed. The standard deviation 
control chart with variable sample size is used to monitor the dispersion over time and 
determine if the pattern changed statistically after introduction of the PAC program in 
September 2005. The standard deviation of the observations in each month is calculated, 
and the center line of the control chart is determined using the data from September 2000 
to August 2005 (i.e., the period before the introduction of the PAC program) as follows 
(Montgomery 2013): 
?̅? = [










m is the number of months 
𝑛𝑖 is the number of submitted bid prices in the i
th month 
𝑠𝑖 is the standard deviation of the deviations of the submitted bid prices from the expected 
bid prices (i.e., the residuals of the regression model for bid prices) in the ith month 
Because the number of submitted bid prices might be different for each month, the 
upper and lower control limits may not be constant and are determined as follows: 













UCL is the upper control limit of the control chart 
LCL is the lower control limit of the control chart  
𝐶4 is a tuning constant that depends on the sample size (i.e., n) 
The estimated center line of the control chart for item 3190 is 6.69, and Figure 6-9 
presents the created standard deviation control chart for this item. As shown by the control 
chart, the standard deviations after the introduction of the PAC program did not go below 
the lower control limit; in some months, it is actually even higher than the upper control 
limit. Therefore, although the results of the surveys and interviews conducted in previous 
studies (Eckert and Eger 2005; Skolnik 2011; Pierce et al. 2012) concluded that offering 
PAC would lead to less dispersion in bid prices, the results of the system monitoring 
process using standard deviation control charts for item 3190 does not show any reduction 
in the dispersion of the submitted bid prices after September 2005, when the PAC program 




Figure 6-9: Standard deviation control chart for line item 3190 
 
The proposed methodology is conducted on the other three major asphalt line items 
(i.e., 3121, 3130, and 1812) as well. Figure 6-10 to Figure 6-12 show the control charts for 
these items. Similar to the results for line item 3190, the results of the system monitoring 
process for the other major asphalt line items do not show any reduction in dispersion of 
the submitted bid prices after the introduction of the PAC program; actually, in some 
months after September 2005, the dispersions are even greater than the upper control limit. 
Therefore, there is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that offering PACs 






































Figure 6-10: Standard deviation control chart for item 3121 
 







































































Figure 6-12: Standard deviation control chart for item 1812 
 
6.6. Summary 
In this chapter, the effects of the offering of PACs on the average number of bidders 
per project, the number of unique bidders divided by the number of total projects for each 
month, and the dispersion of the submitted bid prices for four major asphalt line items were 
analyzed. CUSUM control charts were used for the first two variables: the average number 
of bidders per project and the number of unique contractors bidding each month divided 
by the number of projects. Results from the system monitoring analysis using CUSUM 
control charts indicate that the variations and behaviors of these variables have not 





































Dispersion monitoring analysis was conducted on historical records of the 
submitted bid prices for the four major asphalt line items using standard deviation control 
charts with variable sample size. The standard deviation control charts show that the 
dispersion of the submitted bid prices for all four line items has not decreased after the 
introduction of PAC. This research advances the literature because the results show that 
there is no empirical evidence to indicate that offering PACs would increase the number of 
bidders or decrease the dispersion of the submitted bid prices for asphalt line items. 
Although this study was conducted using bid data from the state of Georgia, the 
proposed methodology can be used for similar datasets in other states and internationally. 
This chapter’s primary contribution to the body of knowledge and state of practice is its 
empirical and statistical analysis of the effects that offering PACs has on the level of 
competition based on the number of bidders and on the dispersion of the submitted bid 
prices. The results of this study can help capital planners of transportation agencies and 
owners of major capital projects systematically evaluate their financial risk management 
strategies, such as PAC. Identifying and analyzing effective factors in the performance of 
PACs, finding more accurate means of improving their effectiveness on the submitted bid 
prices and level of competition, devising a systematic approach to designing PACs, finding 
the most suitable time to implement PACs, and identifying appropriate types of projects 




CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
Volatility in material costs has been a serious challenge for state DOTs and 
contractors since the 2000s. Volatility and uncertainty in the price of critical materials 
increase risk for contractors in fixed-price contracts and can lead to price speculation and 
bid inflation. One of the most common strategies used to address inflated bid prices and 
encourage the submission of lower bids is PACs, which guarantee an adjustment in 
payments to contractors based on the size and direction of material price changes. Contrary 
to the widespread application of PACs by state DOTs, there is little knowledge about how 
asphalt cement prices fluctuate over time. Furthermore, there is little knowledge about 
measuring, analyzing, and forecasting asphalt cement price volatility. This gap in 
knowledge makes it difficult to develop material price risk management strategies 
properly. Moreover, it is not clear how offering PACs in transportation contracts affects 
submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items and their dispersions and the number of 
bidders. 
After a comprehensive review of the existing body of knowledge on uncertainties 
in the price of critical materials in transportation projects and PACs, time series analysis 
was conducted in Chapter 3 to forecast the future price of asphalt cement. ARCH/GARCH 
time series analysis was conducted to quantify and forecast the level of uncertainties in the 
price of asphalt cement in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the impact that offering PACs has on 
submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items was analyzed using multivariate 
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regression analysis. Finally, the effects that offering PACs has on dispersion of submitted 
bid prices and number of bidders were analyzed using system monitoring processes. 
7.2. Summary of Results and Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
In chapter 3, the time series of asphalt cement price is analyzed and its major 
characteristics are identified. The results of this empirical study show that time series data 
of asphalt cement price is autocorrelated and non-stationary and does not show a very 
strong seasonal pattern. Based on the identified time series characteristics, four univariate 
time series forecasting models, Holt ES, Holt-Winters ES, ARIMA, and seasonal ARIMA, 
were created to take into account the short-term variations in asphalt cement price in 
forecasting its future values. The results of in-sample model fitting showed that all four 
models have proper goodness-of-fit. Residual analysis revealed that the underlying 
conditions of the models hold true and, therefore, these time series models are usable. The 
results of the out-of-sample forecasting show that all four time series models can predict 
the future values of asphalt cement price with proper accuracy, but among the four models, 
the ARIMA and Holt ES models are the most accurate with less than 2% error. The primary 
contributions of this chapter of the study to the existing body of knowledge are twofold: 
(1) characterizing the variations of asphalt cement prices over time; and (2) creating 
univariate time series forecasting models to predict future values of asphalt cement prices. 
The results of this study can help both owners and contractors improve the budgeting 
process, prepare more accurate cost estimates, and reduce the risk of asphalt cement price 
variations in transportation projects. 
In chapter 4, the uncertainty of asphalt cement price was measured and forecast 
using ARCH/GARCH models. Results indicate that a GARCH(2,1) model with a 
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conditional mean function of ARMA(2,2) can properly model the conditional volatilities 
in the price of asphalt cement. The primary contributions of this chapter of the study to the 
existing body of knowledge are measuring, modeling, and forecasting uncertainties in the 
price of asphalt cement over time. The results of this study can help transportation agencies 
systematically measure, analyze, and forecast uncertainties in the price of asphalt cement 
and implement their risk management strategies at the right time. 
The primary contributions of chapter 5 of this study to the body of knowledge are 
(1) the creation of several multivariate regression models that have the power to explain 
the variations in highway contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items; 
and (2) the empirical assessment of whether offering PACs contributes to variations in 
contractors’ submitted bid prices for major asphalt line items in highway projects. This 
work is expected to contribute to the construction engineering and management community 
by helping capital planners of transportation agencies and owners of major capital projects 
systematically evaluate the effect of their PACs on the submitted bid prices for their capital 
projects. 
In chapter 6, system monitoring processes were used to analyze the impact of 
offering PACs on number of bidders and dispersion of submitted bid prices. The primary 
contribution of this chapter to the body of knowledge and state of practice is its empirical 
and statistical analysis of the effects that offering PACs has on the level of competition 
based on the number of bidders and on the dispersion of the submitted bid prices. The 
results of this study can help capital planners of transportation agencies and owners of 
major capital projects systematically evaluate their financial risk management strategies, 
such as PAC. 
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7.3. Future Works and Directions 
As explained in the previous sections, this dissertation has focused on analyzing 
uncertainties in the price of asphalt cement to improve risk management strategies for 
material price volatility and on empirically analyzing the performance of PACs and their 
impact on submitted bid prices and level of competition. 
Systematic design of PACs can be an important topic for future studies. As noted 
in chapter 1, a PAC program consists of different elements, such as trigger points; 
eligibility conditions based on duration, quantity of material, and dollar value of projects; 
eligible types of projects; maximum adjustment limit; and price index. Systematically 
determining these factors is very important to improve the performance of PACs. 
Currently, there is little knowledge about design of PACs. Future research can extend this 
dissertation in different ways: 
• Trigger points, which refer to the percent changes in material prices that initiate the 
application of relevant adjustment clauses, may affect the performance of PACs 
significantly. The distribution of the trigger point is broad, and they range from 0% 
to 20%. However, there is little knowledge about systematically determining them. 
In a very rare study, Zhou and Damnjanovic (2011) used a weighted least squares 
regression model to create a generic algorithm for determining the amount of risk 
that should be transferred to owner organizations using strategies such as PACs. 
The results of their model can help determine trigger points in PACs. However, 
their model can be implemented only for materials with future prices that are traded 
in the market.  
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• Eligibility conditions for the PAC program based on factors such as duration of the 
project, quantity of asphalt, and dollar value of the project are important factors that 
affect the performance of PACs. The eligibility conditions differ significantly 
through various states DOTs. For example, GDOT defines eligibility for its PAC 
program only based on duration of a project, whereas many other state DOTs 
consider other factors such as quantity of asphalt. An empirical analysis by Ilbeigi 
et al. (2015b), using unsupervised statistical methods, showed that GDOT could 
improve performance of its PAC program for asphalt cement by defining eligibility 
conditions based on quantity of asphalt and the contract value of the project. 
Developing a systematic approach to determine eligibility conditions is a topic for 
future studies. 
• Some state DOTs offer PACs with an opt-in policy, which gives contractors the 
right to decide whether to accept the PAC (Skolnik 2011). However, there is little 
knowledge about a systematic decision analysis approach to evaluate PACs in given 
market conditions. This, too, can be a basis for future research. 
•  Typically, PAC programs define a maximum adjustment limit that determines the 
maximum amount of financial risk that is shifted to owner organizations. Currently, 
state DOTs determine the maximum adjustment limit solely based on their 
experiences. However, developing a quantitative approach to systematically 
determine the limits can improve the performance of PACs and be a basis for the 
future direction of studies. 
• Contrary to the widespread application of PACs by state DOTs, there is little 
knowledge about the financial value of offering PACs in transportation contracts. 
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This gap in knowledge makes it difficult for contractors and state DOTs to 
systematically evaluate the impact of offering PACs on their risk profiles. Ilbeigi 
et al. (2016b) developed a real option model to estimate the financial value of PAC 
programs for asphalt cement. However, a more comprehensive approach for 
systematically quantifying the financial value of PACs in transportation contracts 
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